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Dr. Vira R. Kivett. 136 pp. 
The present study investigated the relationships between 
personality type, locus of control orientation, and sex role 
orientation and the levels of each of the care and justice 
perspectives in young adults. Subjects were 134 18 to 25 
years old, male and female, caucasian, technical community 
college students who were enrolled in a college transfer 
curriculum. ~ley were administered five paper-and-pencil 
instruments: the Myers-Briggs Personality Type Indicator; 
Rotter's Internal/External Scale; the Bern sex Role Inventory; 
the Relationship Self Inventory; and the Defining Issues 
Test. 
Separate multiple stepwise discriminant analyses were 
performed to test each of the hypotheses. The analyses 
provided partial support for three of the six hypotheses. 
Within th~ care ethic, individuals at the third level were 
found to be androgynous, externally controlled, and to value 
responsibility in relationships. Those at level two were 
masculine, internally controlling rule-followers. care level 
one persons were feminine, internally controlling, who valued 
responsibility in relationships. 
Within the justice ethic, individuals at the third level 
were found to be masculine, externally controlled, and to 
value responsibility in relationships. Those at level two 
were internally controlling rule-followers with 
undifferentiated sex role orientations. None of the subjects 
were classified into level one of the justice perspective. 
Five major conclusions were drawn from the findings: 
1) Levels within two moral perspectives can be predicted by 
personality type, locus of control orientation, and sex role 
orientation; 2) The basis for grouping individuals according 
to moral perspective (by personality or locus of control) 
influences how they are characterized; 3) Care and justice 
ethical perspectives, are more likely to be related to locus 
of control orientation than sex role orientation; 
4) Similarities between the perspectives obscure the 
distinctions between them; and, 5) Some differences between 
the moral approaches depend upon the ways in which moral 
reasoning is operationally defined and measured. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1 
Systematic scientific observations of personality over 
the past 100 years have contributed to numerous theoretical 
explanations of the psychosocial attributes which define the 
construct. Most have been established by meticulous, 
systematic procedural studies based on the experimental 
method. However, not all personality theorists agree that a 
rigorous scientific method is the best way to understand 
personality. It was on the basis of his clinical 
observations that Freud developed psychoanalysis and a theory 
of personality. Rather than using introspection merely to 
examine present-moment phenomena, he taught his patients to 
use it retrospectively in order to analyze past experiences. 
In this way Freud was able to investigate events that could 
not be elicited in a laboratory (Engler, 1991, p.4). 
Not only have a variety of approaches been followed in 
developing personality theories, but theorists have chosen to 
emphasize a wide range of factors which influence the 
development of personality. Some have stressed early 
childhood experiences (Adler, 1917; Erikson, 1963) while 
others have accentuated heredity (Jung, 1936; Sheldon, 
stevens, & Tucker, 1970). The diverse procedures that have 
been followed in assessing personality and the range of 
emphases that have been considered have produced divergent 
opinions regarding most human behavior and its etiology. 
Moral reasoning, an integral behavioral component of one's 
personality, is a case in point. 
The Problem 
2 
Numerous investigators have suggested the importance of 
moral perspective to human behavior (Gilligan & Attanucci, 
1988; Gilligan, 1988, 1982; Lonky et al., 1988; Brown et al., 
1988; Ford & Lowery, 1986; Reinhart et al., 1985; Daniels, 
1984). Other studies have been less supportive of the 
relationship (Walker, 1984; Gibbs et al., 1984). Together, 
this research provides the impetus for further examination of 
the moral perspective variable. Research has demonstrated a 
relationship between moral perspective and several 
personality attributes: 1) personality type (Tappan, 1985), 
2) locus of control orientation (Gutkin & Suls, 1979), and 
3) sex role orientation (Lonky et al., 1988). In addition, 
a review of the literature (Walker, 1984) has demonstrated 
that differences in moral perspective-taking are most often 
found among the young adult population since this 
developmental period is conceived as a transition from the 
egocentrism of childhood and adolescence to the moral 
maturity more often found in middle and late adulthood 
(Kohlberg, 1981). 
The present study will investigate the relationship 
between three independent variables (personality type, locus 
of control orientation, and sex role orientation) and moral 
perspective in young adults 18 to 25 years of age. The 
research question that is posed is: Can young adults be 
grouped with respect to moral perspective by personality, by 
locus of control orientation, and by sex role orientation? 
Hypotheses 
Based upon the theoretical and research literature, the 
following six hypotheses were posited: 
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Hypothesis I. High "Primacy of Both Self and Other 
Care" scores will be associated with Empathist and Analyst 
personalities, with an internal locus of control orientation, 
and with feminine and androgynous sex role orientations. 
Hypothesis II. High "Primacy of Other Care" scores will 
be associated with Empathist and Analyst personalities, with 
an external locus of control orientation, and with feminine 
and androgynous sex role orientations. 
Hypothesis III. High "Primacy of Self Care" scores 
will be associated with Legalist and Realist personalities, 
with an internal locus of control orientation, and with 
masculine and androgynous sex role orientations. 
Hypothesis IV. High "Postconventional" (or principled) 
scores will be associated with Empathist and Analyst 
personalities, with an internal locus of control orientation, 
and with masculine and androgynous sex role orientations. 
Hypothesis v. High "Conventional" scores will be 
associated with Legalist and R~alist personalities, with an 
external locus of control orientation, and with masculine, 
feminine, and androgynous sex role orientations. 
Hypothesis VI. High "Preconventional" scores will be 
associated with Legalist and Realist personalities, with an 
internal locus of control orientation, and with a masculine 
sex role orientation. 
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Several studies have suggested the importance of 
psychosocial attributes to moral reasoning. Tappan (1985) 
repor~ed that certain vocational personality types were more 
strongly related to social-cognitive development in the 
domains of justice judgment and ethical evaluation than were 
others. This position was supported by Lifton (1982) who 
noted that individuals possessing a similar type of reasoning 
tend to be similar themselves. 
In his humanistic personality theory, Rogers (1961) 
identified a self-actualizing tendency as the foundation of 
a person's personality. Self actualization, the culmination 
of the self-actualizing tendency, has been related to moral 
maturity, in particular to post-conventional moral reasoning, 
the highest level of moral development (Daniels, 1984). 
The importance the locus of control orientation variable 
to moral perspective was supported by Gutkin and Suls (1979). 
These researchers found a significant relationship between 
advocacy of social responsibility, a care perspective 
quality, and an internal locus of control orientation. 
An additional support for the relationship between locus 
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of control orientation and moral reasoning was the outcome of 
deductive reasoning. Numerous studies have indicated that 
affective involvement influences moral perspective (Lonky 
et al., 1988; Gilligan, 1982; Rybash et al., 1981; r.ickona, 
1978; Kohlberg et al., 1972). Research however, suggests 
that the relationship between affective involvement and moral 
perspective is not a simple one (Locke & Tucker, 1988). 
Race, for example, may be an important intervening variable. 
Locke and Tucker (1988) reported that Black and White 
subjects were differentially affected by emotional distance. 
Other research findings indicate that Blacks tend to exhibit 
an external locus of control orientation (Lefcourt, 1973). 
Collectively, these findings suggest that the influence that 
affective involvement has upon moral perspective-taking may 
be mediated by the degree of perceived control one possesses. 
The relationship between sex role orientation and 
moral perspective is marked by inconsistent and contradictory 
research findings (Walker, 1984). Diverse findings may be 
due to the fact that gender has been typically indexed by 
biological sex. If moral perspective is influenced by 
socialization as suggested by Gilligan (1988, 1982), then 
indexing gender by psychological sex orientation would be the 
more appropriate procedure. Studies that have measured 
gender by psychological sex role have found a greater use of 
the care-based moral perspective among males with feminine 
sex role orientations (Lonky et al., 1988; Ford & Lowery, 
1986). 
The dependent variable, moral perspective, consists of 
two distinct orientations: 1) a care-based approach grounded 
in connectedness to and feelings of responsibility for 
others; and, 2) a justice-based approach founded upon rights 
and rules developed to guide behavior. The care perspective 
is conceived as a dimension with three hierarchical levels. 
In ascending order they are 1) Primacy of Self Care; 
2) Primacy of Other Care; and 3) Primacy of Both Self and 
Other Care (Gilligan, Brown, & Rogers, 1990; Reinhart et 
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al., 1985; Gilligan, 1982, 1977). The justice perspective is 
viewed also as a dimension with three hierarchical levels. 
In ascending order they are 1) Preconventional; 
2) conventional; and 3) Postconventional (Kohlberg, 1981). 
The literature surrounding moral development, moral 
reasoning, and moral perspective demonstrates a plethora of 
ambiguities, contradictions and inconsistencies. As a 
result, there is a need to identify variables associated 
with morality which might be used to clarify current 
ambiguities and to resolve present inconsistencies. 
Importance of the Study 
Erikson (1963) suggested the existence of eight ages, or 
stages, through which humans progress. Each age is 
characterized by a specific task or challenge which must be 
addressed during that stage. Success at each age depends 
upon a person's adjustments to the demands in previous 
7 
stages. 
During young adulthood, roughly between the ages of 18 
and 25 according to Erikson and corresponding to his Stage 6, 
men and women must resolve the critical issue of becoming 
intimate with a member of the opposite sex. Marriage is 
usually the form that this resolution ultimately takes. 
Soon after marriage there usually follows the challenges of 
incipient parenthood. Failure to attain intimacy produces 
painful loneliness and a sense of being incomplete. 
Young adulthood is also typically a time for attending 
college and for deciding and beginning career pursuits. It 
is a time for leaving the home of one's family of origin. 
Two major characteristics of the mature individual are the 
abilities to exercise self-sufficiency and to maintain 
self- direction (Wise, 1986, p. 357). These abilities are 
challenged extensively between the ages of 18 and 25. 
Altogether, young adulthood can be a period of stress, 
replete with conflicts within relationships brought about by 
that stress. Indeed, the highest percentage of divorces 
occur in the first few years of marriage (Reiss, 1980, 
p. 317). 
Erikson's Stage 6 is genuinely a time of conflicting 
needs, desires, rights, and responsibilities in one's 
relationships to and dealings with others. Competing rights 
and needs are the bases for dilemmas used to assess moral 
perspective (Gilligan, 1988; Kohlberg, 1981). Thus, young 
adulthood is a time during which one's moral perspective is 
often revealed. 
Knowledge of one's own and others' moral perspectives 
can be seen as useful in conflict resolution. Studies of 
young adults may identify predictors of moral perspective. 
Reliable findings would serve as an important source of 
information in clinical and non-clinical settings which 
attempt the amelioration of the challenging and problematic 
issues of young adulthood. If shown to be predictive of 
moral perspective, personality type, locus of control 
orientation, and sex role orientation information would be 
useful in mate selection, career selection, and conflict 
resolution in both treatment and non-treatment situations. 
The present study extended the current research 
literature on moral perspectives in two distinct ways. 
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First, it examined the influence of psychosocial attributes 
upon moral perspective. The value of such an approach lay 
in its bringing about a fuller understanding of the moral 
perspective construct. Second, this study tested a 
relatively unexamined instrument, the Relationship Self 
Inven~ory (RSI; Reinhart et al., 1985). The RSI is a 
reliable measure of Gilligan's model of the connected self 
and orientation to care (Reinhart et al., 1985). The RSI was 
used to assess the three levels of the care perspective. 
In summary, the current study attempted to clarify 
ambiguities and resolve inconsistencies in the moral 
development literature as they relate to specific 
psychosocial attributes. In addition, since new experience 
has been shown to modify behavior, findings from the present 
research regarding correlates of moral perspective are 
valuable in potential attempts to alter moral 
perspective-taking in clinical and non-clinical settings. 
Such information also contributes to a more complete and, 
therefore, valid conception of the moral perspective 
construct. 
Moral Perspectives Theory 
9 
Numerous studies have reported conflicting results 
regarding the moral reasoning of males and females. 
Kohlberg's approach (1963, 1981) to the study of moral 
development suggests a deficiency in the moral development of 
women relative to men since their judgments seem to exemplify 
the third stage of his six-stage hierarchy. At this stage, 
morality is conceptualized in interpersonal terms and 
goodness is identified with helping and pleasing others. 
Thus, the qualities that traditionally have defined the 
"goodness" of women, caring for and being sensitive to the 
needs of others, are the very same ones that classify them as 
deficient in moral development (Gilligan, 1982, p.18). 
Gilligan (1982) has suggested that gender-related 
factors give rise to two separate and distinct approaches, 
or perspectives, to moral reasoning. One line of reasoning 
equates morality with justice, where a moral problem is 
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constructed as an issue of rights and rules. The other 
approach identifies morality with care and constructs a moral 
problem as an issue of connectedness to others and 
responsibilities in relationships. The justice perspective 
is subjectively associated with men, and the care perspective 
with women (Gilligan, 1988; 1982; Gilligan, & Attanucci, 
1988; Brown et al., 1988). However, when comparative studies 
of moral development are made of males and females, 
statistically significant differences generally are not found 
(Gibbs et al., 1984; Walker, 1984). It should be noted that 
in these instances investigators typically have indexed 
gender by means of biological sex. When gender is measured 
via psychological sex role, gender differences are found 
(Lonky et al., 1988; Ford & Lowery, 1986). 
The importance of moral reasoning to other elements of 
the personality suggested the need for studies which will: 
1) clarify the bases for the contradictions and 
controversies within moral reasoning research; 2) consolidate 
overlapping concepts and constructs; and 3) offer direction 
for future investigations of moral reasoning. Integral to 
this end is the formulation of a conceptual framework which 
will encompass and integrate the divergent results and 
conclusions of the moral reasoning literature. 
Conceptual Framework 
Two divergent theoretical systems have significantly 
influenced the study of personality in adulthood: 1) the 
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psychoanalytic approach, and 2) the behavioral and social 
learning approach. The psychoanalytic approach has focused 
upon cognitive structures that are proposed as underlying 
overt behavior (Freud, 1940; Jung, 1936; Adler, 1927; Horney, 
1950). According to Rosen: 
The structuralist scans the surface manifestations 
of things or events and penetrates below these to 
grasp the underlying order and significance which 
form a meaningful pattern. The superficial detail 
and diversity that appear on the surface prove to 
be less significant than the coherent pattern of 
the deep structures which give rise to what is 
overtly perceived. The submerged patterned 
relationships of whatever is under consideration 
are what constitute the sources of reality and 
account for observed regularities, rather than the 
atomized surface details (Rosen, 1980, pp. 1-2). 
By contrast, the behavioral and social learning approach 
has stressed the role of the environment in the influence and 
determination of behavior. The behavioral aspect of this 
theoretical body suggests that human behavior can be 
explained by a reciprocal determinism that involves 
behavioral and environmental factors (Skinner, 1953). The 
social learning aspect finds it desirable to introduce 
internal, cognitive variables. It holds that it is the 
subjective meaning and interpretation of the environment in 
conjunction with environmental reinforcement that actually 
regulates behavior (Bandura, 1977; Rotter, 1982, 1954). 
Both Piaget (1973, 1965) and Kohlberg (1981, 1963) 
adhere to the structuralist theoretical position. Piaget's 
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theory of moral development served as a point of departure 
for Kohlberg's investigations into that field (Rosen, 1980). 
As structuralists they held a view that tends to minimize 
environmental effects, i.e., the effects of socialization. 
While Piaget suggested that new structures are continually 
under construction owing to the individual's interaction with 
the environment, he stressed the primary role of the existing 
structure in regulating environmental influence. 
Gilligan, a social psychologist, adheres to the 
cognitive-behavioral-social learning approach. Her view 
emphasizes the role of socialization and the subjective 
meaning and interpretation of the environment. It minimizes 
the potential influence of inherent factors in the 
explanation of behavior. As such, she and Kohlberg appear to 
be at opposite ends of an epistemological continuum. The 
social learning perspective is in keeping with that of the 
present study. 
Assumptions and Limitations 
Assumptions 
The primary assumption of the current study was that 
moral perspective can be identified and indexed within a 
young adult population. A care-based moral perspective was 
assumed to be an approach to moral reasoning that is grounded 
in interpersonal relationships and responsibility to others. 
~ ~ustice-based moral perspective was assumed to be an 
orientation founded upon rights specified by implicit and 
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explicit social rules. Furthermore, it was assumed that 
personality type, locus of control orientation, and sex role 
orientation are constructs which are stable over time and can 
be accurately indexed among a young adult population. In 
addition, the two moral perspectives were assumed to be 
linear with normal distributions and equal variances among 
all levels. 
Personality type was assumed to be an accurate 
reflection of an individual's characteristic pattern of 
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that persist over time and 
situations. Locus of control orientation was assumed to be 
an individual's beliefs regarding the extent to which 
behavioral consequences from the environment are the direct 
result of forces within themselves or, conversely, are 
controlled by external, environmental forces beyond their 
control. Sex role orientation was assumed to reflect the 
degree of an individual's identification with stereotypical 
images of masculine and/or feminine personalities. Equal 
variances were assumed among the independent variables. 
Limitations 
Several limitations of the current study are 
acknowledged. First and foremost is the issue of 
representativeness. Generalizability is limited to a 
population similar to the one which will form the sample to 
be investigated in the present study. Another limitation is 
that the causal nature of any observed correlations can not 
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be specified. Also, the data consist entirely of self-
reported responses which have limited objectivity. In 
addition, there exists the possibility that other independent 
variables not included in the current study might be able to 
account for more unexplained variance in the dependent 
variable, moral perspective, than the independent variables 
selected for study. Finally, the fact that responses were 
collected in a classroom context raises the question of the 
degree of ecological validity of the current investigation. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATL~ 
15 
Literally speaking, conscience means "together" (con) 
and "to know" (scire). Eby and Arrowood ( 1940, p. 15), 
therefore, define conscience as an "ideal of conduct that the 
individual implicitly agrees with others to maintain and 
chooses himself to observe." This Latin formulation replaces 
an earljer Middle English derivation meaning "knowledge 
within" (Webster's, 1978). Thus, most people think of 
conscience as an internal feeling of right and wrong. The 
first definition emphasizes the influence of the external 
world in the formulation of morality while the second focuses 
upon the influence of the internal cognitive world. Early 
studies of conscience, and theoretical formulations served 
as a springboard into recent investigations of moral 
development, moral reasoning, and moral perspective (Wise, 
1986, p.358). 
Theoretical Background for Moral Perspective Studies 
Freud was one of the first modern researchers and 
theoreticians to examine conscience. He suggested the 
existence of an internal mental structure, the superego, 
which continually monitors a person's behaviors and motives 
(Freud, 1938). Although Freud acknowledged the influence of 
one's social context by noting that the superego is shaped by 
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primary socializing agents in the environment, he emphasized 
the primacy of the innate cognitive structure. 
In contrast to Freud's psychoanalytic theory of 
conscience is that of social learning theory (Bandura, 1973). 
Although both emphasize the central role of identification in 
conscience development, the social learning theory stresses 
modeling and imitation, that is to say the environmental 
context, to a greater degree. It also stresses subjective 
meaning and interpretation of the environment, but gives 
greater emphasis to the overt moral behavior than does the 
psychoanalytic theory. 
Piaget's cognitive theory (Piaget, 1973,1965) also 
addresses the development of moral abilities. It focuses 
upon the influence of cognitive development upon moral 
development. Little emphasis is given to the environmental 
context, that is to moral instruction or parental influence. 
Piaget suggests that parents designate rules and children 
respond to them based upon their own level of cognitive 
development (Wise, 1986). Whereas social learning theory is 
aligned with psychoanalytic theory due to a common tenet, the 
role of identification in moral development, cognitive theory 
can be seen as being more closely aligned to it. Both 
cognitive and psychoanalytic theories are structuralist 
theories. They share the fundamental theoretical notion of 
positing underlying cognitive structures that, although 
responsive to environmental influences, retain a sense of 
primacy owing perhaps to their innateness (Rosen, 1980). 
The psychoanalytic (Freud, 1938), social learning 
(Bandura, 1973), and cognitive (Piaget, 1973, 1965) bodies 
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of theory regarding conscience and moral development comprise 
the range of theoretical underpinnings for current 
investigations of moral perspective. The three bodies are 
not mutually exclusive in that some doctrines are held in 
common by some subset of the three, or by all three (Wise, 
1986). All accept the notion that moral behavior depends 
upon the cognitive development of the individual, but 
cognitive theory conceives of it as a more central idea than 
do the others. All designate the importance of 
internalization of parental values, in one form or another, 
to the process of moral development. Psychoanalytic and 
social learning theories alone emphasize the role of 
identification in conscience development. 
While the three theories can be grouped in a number of 
ways according to specific tenets, it is the grouping 
determined by their fundamental theoretical assumptions 
regarding: 1) the existence of innate cognitive structures 
underlying overt behavior, and 2) the relative influence of 
internal processes versus environmental socialization upon 
moral development that creates the greatest contrast among 
the three (Engler, 1991; Wise, 1986; Rosen, 1980). The 
psychoanalytic and cognitive theories are structuralist 
theories while, strictly speaking, social learning theory is 
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not. These structuralist theories emphasize the primacy of 
internal structures, mediated by environmental influences, in 
determining moral development. Social learning theory 
emphasizes the primacy of socialization, mediated by 
perceptual processes, not structures, which give subjective 
meaning to and interpretation of the environment in 
determining moral development. The position is taken in the 
current study that it is this fundamental theoretical 
divergence that is the source of the controversial 
dichotomization of positions regarding moral perspective. 
Moral Development Theory and Moral Perspective 
Kohlberg and Moral Development 
Lawrence Kohlberg has been an eminently stimulating 
influence in the investigation of moral development. His 
theory (Kohlberg, 1963; 1981) has pre-empted other models 
such as Peck's (Peck, 1960) and Piaget's (Piaget, 1965). He 
classified moral development into three levels with each 
level further divided into stages. The levels and stages 
form a hierarchy which describes the developmental sequence 
of moral development (Wise, 1986). 
The earliest, and lowest, level of moral behavior is 
egocentric. Morality is determined by the consequences of an 
action to the actor. This level, the Preconventional level, 
is divided into three stages. At Stage 0 whatever is wanted 
and liked is deemed moral. At Stage 1, typically attained by 
age 3, actions are based on fear and the avoidance of 
19 
punishment. At Stage 2, attained by age 4, actions are based 
upon the existence of positive consequences. 
At the second level, Conventional, moral behavior is 
determined by an awareness of social rules and conventions. 
At Stage 3, at about 7 to 8 years of age, behavior is 
influenced primarily by a desire for approval. At Stage 4, 
at about age 10, moral behavior is guided by establish~d 
authority. Rules are obeyed because they are rules. 
At the third and highest level, the Preconventional 
level, principles are the basis of moral decisions. At Stage 
5 rules are interpreted as social contracts with specific 
purposes. Therefore they are not arbitrarily imposed and may 
at times even be suspended. At Stage 6 an individual has a 
fully internalized set of ethical principles which preclude 
purposeful harm to self and others, and may at times 
supercede rules of civil authority which are inconsistent 
with his or her ethical value system. These internalized 
principles are most often conceptualized by the individual as 
universal. At Stage 7, a theoretical stage, behavior is 
influenced by an awareness of an eternal, cosmic order. 
Since it is believed that so few people achieve Stages 6 and 
7, these stages are typically excluded in investigations of 
moral development (Wise, 1986). 
Kohlberg's theory is based in large part upon Piagetian 
cognitive theory. Both Piaget and Kohlberg adopted the 
theoretical position of structuralism which is an assumed 
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procedure for analyzing and understanding phenomena. Both 
believed in the existence of deep universal structures within 
the human organism which account for formal patterned 
regularities in moral development and moral reasoning. The 
surface manifestations of overt moral reasoning or its 
environmental influences were considered less significant 
than the coherent pattern of the underlying substrate of 
structures which give rise to the perception of action or its 
context (Rosen, 1980). The ultimate focus of the 
structuralist in studying moral development is not upon the 
individual's moral reasoning behavior nor upon the perceiving 
involved in that moral reasoning. It is the submerged 
universal structures which are credited as the source of both 
the perceiving processes and the moral reasoning processes 
which are the events typically examined in the study of moral 
development. In contrast, a social learning theorist, such 
as Carol Gilligan, focuses upon the roles of socialization 
and internal, interpretative perceptual processes, not 
structures, in the investigation of moral development. 
Gilliqan and Moral Perspective 
Gilligan (1982) has proposed that moral development is 
a multi-dimensional construct that is experienced 
differentially by individuals owing to some gender-related 
factor or factors. She suggests that this gender influence 
is probably determined by masculine and feminine 
socialization and by the perceiving processes involved in 
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psychological sex role orientation-taking. She concludes 
that it generally leads men and women to assume divergent 
perspectives when confronting moral issues. While men and 
women can and do assume both perspectives, there is typically 
differential perspective-taking along gender lines (Gilligan 
& Attanucci, 1988). 
The moral perspective orientation associated primarily 
with women, the care perspective, is grounded in 
connectedness to and feelings for others with which one is in 
relationship. This perspective would hold that, 
theoretically, one is in relationship with every human. The 
orientation associated primarily with men, the justice 
perspective, focuses upon individual rights and the socially 
determined rules used to guide behavior in protecting those 
rights. This perspective implies a respect for the social 
structure and social stability produced by rule-following. 
Research suggests that the gender-related factor 
influencing the selective assumption of moral orientations is 
a "self-in-relation-to-others" construct (Gilligan, Brown, & 
Rogers, 1990; Gilligan, 1982). This construct refers to the 
ways in which persons define their ego boundaries. The 
connected/relational self is determined by one's 
connectedness to others and is characteristic of, but not 
unique to, women. The separate/objective self is grounded in 
an "objective reciprocity in relationships and upon o1~e' s 
individual, separate activities and achievements; it is 
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characteristic of, but not unique to, men" (Stronunen et al., 
1987). Psychoanalytic theory, which is structuralist in 
nature, suggests that separation from others, a process Jung 
termed "individuation", is essential for healthy identity 
formation (Freud, 1940); Jung, 1936). Gilligan (1982), as a 
proponent of social learning theory which stresses the role 
of environmental socialization and the role of subjective 
meaning and interpretation of the environment, argues that 
remaining connected to others is not only healthy, but also 
may be necessary for the development of self-concept. 
Personality Type and Moral Perspective 
Theory-based Literature 
Numbers of personality theorists have found it useful to 
classify individuals according to one or more behavioral 
traits (Jung, 1933; Horney, 1937; Rogers, 1961; Sheldon et 
al., 1970; Cattell, 1965; Eysenck, 1970). One of the 
earliest typologies was developed by Jung (1933). Jung 
suggested that people can be divided into two general 
attitudinal types: introverts and extroverts. Introverts are 
conceived as being concerned with their own inner worlds. 
They tend to be unsociable and to lack confidence in their 
dealings with others. Conversely, extroverts are more 
concerned with the external world. They are especially 
interested in other people and in the events going on around 
them. They tend to be "joiners", fulfilling a need to 
affiliate themselves with others (Morris, 1988). 
Jung further differentiated people into rational and 
irrational categories (Jung, 1933). Rational individuals 
guide their behavior by the use of the psychological 
functions of thinking or feeling. In making some decision, 
they will be regulated either by logical reasoning or by 
emotional factors and value judgments. In contrast, 
irrational individuals regulate their actions by the use of 
the psychological functions of sensing or intuiting. 
Decisions are made based on perception that comes through 
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the senses or through the unconscious (non-verbal) process of 
intuition (Morris, 1988). 
Most individuals exhibit all four psychological 
functions, but according to Jung, one or 
more of them is usually dominant. Thus, 
a thinking person is ~ational and logical 
and decides upon the basis of facts. The 
feeling person is sensitive to his or her 
surroundings, acts tactfully, and has a 
balanced sense of values. The sensing type 
relies primarily on surface perceptions and 
rarely uses imagination or deeper understanding. 
And the intuitive type sees beyond obvious facts 
to predict future possibilities (Morris, 1988, p.465). 
Jung (1933) also divided people in terms of their 
preferences for a) making judgments about the world based 
upon a minimum number of observations versus b) merely 
observing the world while making a minimum number of 
judgments about their observations. The former he described 
as judging and the latter he designated perceiving. Thus, 
according to Jung, an individual's personality type is 
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determined by the references he or she has along four 
separate dimensions: 1) extroversion-introversion, 2) 
sensing-intuiting (irrational category), 3) thinking-feeling 
(rational category), and 4) judging-perceiving. Therefore, a 
person's personality type will be the combination of four 
preferences. He or she will be either extroverted or 
introverted, and either sensing or intuiting, and either 
thinking or feeling, and either judging or perceiving. 
Keirsey and Bates (1984) expanded Jung's theory. They 
suggested that the irrational category differentiates 
individuals more so than any of the remaining dimensions. 
Thus sensors and intuitives are the most different of all the 
pairs. Furthermore they note that among sensors the greatest 
differences are observed in relation to the perception-
judging dimension. Thus for sensors, the greatest 
differences appear between those who prefer simply observing 
the world around them compared to forming judgments or 
conclusions about what is observed. In contrast, among 
intuitives the greatest differences are observed in relation 
to the thinking-feeling dimension, that is, in terms of the 
basis upon which judgments or conclusions are formed, via 
reason and logic or through values and feelings. Thus for 
intuitives, the greatest differences appear between those who 
prefer to form judgments based upon logical reasoning or 
upon feelings and values. The authors suggest that these 
four resulting groups represent four fundamental 
psychological temperaments: Dionysian, Epimethean, 
Promethean, and Apollonian. 
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Keirsey and Bates (1984) suggested that Dionysians are 
individuals who make decisions based on information that 
comes through the senses (sensing) and who prefer to merely 
observe the environment while making few judgments about it 
(perceiving). In contrast, Epimetheans are individuals who 
make decisions based on information that comes through the 
senses (sensing). They prefer to make judjments about the 
environment based upon a minimum number of observations of it 
(judging). 
Prometheans are individuals who make decisions based on 
information that comes through the unconscious (non-verbal) 
process of intuition (intuiting). They prefer to make 
judgments about environmental observations based upon logical 
reasoning. In contrast, Apollonians are individuals who make 
decisions based on information that comes through the 
unconscious (non-verbal) process of intuition (intuiting). 
They prefer to make judgments about environmental 
observations based upon feelings and values. 
RoBards (1986) replaced the Greek mythological-based 
names for the Keirsey and Bates' four fundamental 
temperaments with a nomenclature that is more readily 
understood by readers not well-versed in the heroic Greek 
myths. Thus the Epimethean, the Apollonian, the Dionysian, 
and the Promethean temperaments were renamed the Legalist, 
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the Empathist, the Realist, and the Analyst, respectively. 
According to RoBards (1986} the Legalist temperament is 
conservative, serious, responsible, and a rule-follower. The 
Empathist is warm, communicative, and interested in values 
based on responsibility within relationships. The Realist is 
physical, spontaneous, and game-playing. The Analyst is 
logical, competent, and theoretical. Behavioral descriptions 
of the Legalist temperament, and to a lesser extent the 
Realist temperament appear to correspond to the justice-based 
moral perspective. Behavioral descriptions of the Empathist 
temperament, and to a lesser extent the Analyst temperament 
appear to correspond to the care-based moral perspective. 
Research-based Literature 
The research literature demonstrates that while 
psychologists often are at odds over the definition, 
underlying processes, and procedures used to investigate 
moral development, they agree that individuals possessing a 
similar type of moral reasoning tend to have similar 
personalities (Lifton, 1982). This position was supported by 
Tappan (1985) who investigated adult social cognition in the 
domains of justice judgment and ethical evaluation and their 
relationship to personal and vocational interests. Results 
indicated that certain vocational personality types (health 
service workers, religious workers) were more strongly 
related to social-cognitive development in the domains of 
justice judgment and ethical evaluation than were others 
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(electrical technicians, clerical machine operators). 
A variety of personality constructs have been found to 
be related to moral reasoning and moral development. Of 
these constructs, self-concept is the most important. 
Personal identity plays an integral role in determining the 
quality of interpersonal relationships (Mussen, 1974). 
Individuals with more negative self-concepts view themselves 
as inferior and may be more inclined to follow group 
concensus in reasoning over some moral issue. Those with 
more positive self-concepts are less likely to show undue 
submission to authority or overdependence on the approval of 
others (Wise, 1986). 
Rogers' humanistic theory of personality (1961) 
identified a self-actualizing tendency as the driving force 
in personality development. This tendency is defned as a 
drive to fulfill one's self-concept. It is suggested that 
just as there appears to be a natural inclination to fulfill 
innate biological potentials, so to is there a tendency to 
live out the images one has formed for himself or herself. 
Self-actualization, the culmination of the self-actualizing 
tendency, has been related to postconventional moral 
reasoning, the highest level of moral development (Daniels, 
1984). 
Locus of Control and Moral Perspective 
Theory-based Literature 
Social learning theory has posited the existence of 
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three interrelated psychosocial components: a cognitive, 
mediating perceptual process; generalized expectancy; and 
locus of control orientation (Rotter, 1966). This framework 
stresses the importance of perception in providing meaning to 
and interpretation of one's contextural environment. 
Perceptual processes provide the mechanism whereby causal or 
contingency relationships in the environment may be 
identified. Causal perception, or generalized expectancy, is 
the basis for the locus of control orientation construct. 
Thus, one may conclude that a causal relationship exists 
between forces beyond one's control and rewards, and 
therefore be identified as believing in external control. In 
contrast, one might conclude that rewards are contingent upon 
personal behavior, and consequently be designated as 
possessing an internal locus of control orientation. An 
external locus of control orientation appears to correspond 
in general with a justice-based moral perspective's emphasis 
upon external society-based rules. An internal locus of 
control orientation appears to correspond in general with a 
care-based moral perspective's focus upon individual 
responsibility in dealing with others. 
Research-based Literature 
The research literature has suggested both a direct and 
an indirect association between locus of control orientation 
and moral perspective. Gutkin and Suls (1979) reported a 
significant relationship between advocacy of social 
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responsibility and an internal locus of control orientation. 
Subjects who showed greater tendencies toward social 
responsibility also tended to show more internal locus of 
control. Social responsibility corresponded to 
responsibility in relationship to others which is a defining 
characteristic of the care-based moral perspective. 
Locus of control also appears to be indirectly 
associated with moral perspective. Numerous studies have 
indicated that affective involvement influences moral 
perspective (Lanky et al., 1988; Gilligan, 1982; Rybash et 
al., 1981; Lickona, 1978; Kohlberg et al., 1972). 
Investigators generally have examined affective distance by 
having subjects place themselves in the role of the primary 
character in a moral dilemma. Research, however, suggests 
that the relationship between affective involvement and moral 
perspective is not a simple one (Locke & Tucker, 1988). 
Race, for example, may be an important intervening variable. 
Locke and Tucker (1988) gave both Black and White college 
students either the usual form of Rest et al.'s Defining 
Issues Test (DIT; 1974) or an adapted DIT in which the 
characters were Black. This racial manipulation affected the 
emotional distance of Black, but not White, subjects. This 
finding, along with other research findings which indicate 
that Blacks tend to exhibit an external locus of control 
orientation (Lefcourt, 1973), suggests that the influence 
that affective involvement has upon moral perspective-taking 
may be mediated by the degree of perceived control one 
possesses. 
Sex Role Orientation and Moral Perspective 
Theory-based Literature 
Social learning theory suggests that the acquisition 
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of gender-consistent behavior is based upon selective 
reinforcement of behaviors considered to be gender-
appropriate by relevant others in the surrounding 
environment. Appropriate behavior is initially prompted 
through the process of modeling. Imitation, in turn, leads 
to identification with one' own gender. Any behavior which 
is differentially reinforced for the separate genders will be 
incorporated into behavioral repetoires along gender lines 
(Mischel, 1970). 
Socialization is a primary construct in social learning 
theory and refers to the process by which children learn the 
behavior and attitudes appropriate to their society (Bandura, 
1973). Societies selectively encourage males and females to 
adopt somewhat different attitudes and behavior patterns 
because it is believed to reflect inherent differences 
between the sexes (Deaux, 1985). Differential moral 
perspective-taking by men and women is thought to be the 
result of gender-specific socialization (Gilligan, 1982). 
Research-based Literature 
Gilligan (1977, 1982) suggested that an interpersonal 
orientation, sensitivity and caring for others, primarily 
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observed in women and apparently the result of feminine 
socialization, influences one's moral perspective. This 
perception has prompted an abundance of studies examining the 
relationship between gender and moral perspective (Vasudev, 
1988; Gilligan and Attanucci, 1988; Walker, 1984; Gibbs et 
al., 1984). Results generally have been contradictory. 
Inconsistent findings may be due to the fact that gender has 
been typically indexed by biological sex. If moral 
perspective is influenced by socialization as suggested by 
Giligan, then indexing gender by psychological sex 
orientation would be the more appropriate procedure. Studies 
that have measured gender by sex role have reported a greater 
use of the care-based moral perspective among males with 
feminine sex role orientations (Lanky et al., 1988; Ford 
& Lowery, 1986). 
Summary 
Theory-based literature has posited the logical 
relationship between the constructs to be examined in the 
current study. Behavioral characteristics of personality 
temperaments appear to differentially correspond with those 
of individuals associated with different moral perspectives. 
Legalists and Realists appear to correspond with a justice 
perspective, while Empathists and Analysts appear to 
correspond with a care perspective. In addition, an external 
locus of control orientation appears to correspond with a 
justice-based moral perspective, while an internal locus of 
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control orientation appears to correspond with a care-based 
moral perspective. Finally, a masculine sex role orientation 
appears to correspond with a justice-based moral perspective, 
while a feminine sex role orientation appears to correspond 
with a care-based moral perspective. 
CHAPTER III 
METHOD AND PROCEDURES 
The purpose of this research was to investigate the 
relationship between the independent variables of 
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1) personality type, 2) locus of control orientation, and 3) 
sex role orientation and the dependent variable of interest, 
moral perspective. The association between each of 
the independent variables and each of two moral perspectives, 
the care perspective and the justice perspective, was 
examined. 
Sample Selection 
Subjects for the study consisted of 243 male and 
female undergraduates enrolled in an Introductory Psychology 
course at Guilford Technical Community College (GTCC), 
Jamestowm Campus, Jamestown, North Carolina. Only the data 
from 134 subjects who were caucasian, between the ages of 18 
and 25, and who were college transfer students were included 
in the analyses. Data collected from students enrolled in 
technical curricula were saved for later analyses. College 
transfer students were more likely to possess similar goals 
and interests compared to students enrolled in the diverse 
technical curricula at GTCC. Therefore, they were likely to 
represent a more homeogeneous population. 
A review of the moral perspective literature suggested 
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that it is among young adults that one is most likely to 
observe gender-related differences in moral reasoning 
orientations (Walker, 1984). Therefore, data analyses in the 
present study were limited to that obtained from students who 
were between 18 and 25 years of age. 
Research suggested that race may be a possible 
intervening variable between one of the predictors, locus of 
control, and moral perspective (Locke & TUcker, 1988). 
However, for purposes of the statistical analyses an 
insufficient number of Blacks existed in the sample to be 
studied. Analyses in the current study were performed upon a 
homogeneous sample of White subjects. Data collected from 
Black students were saved for later analyses. 
Measurement 
Data were collected using a group- and individually-
administered questionnaire (Appendix). The questionnaire 
consisted of six sections: I. Demographic Information; 
II. Relationship Self Inventory; III. Defining Issues Test; 
IV. Myers-Briggs Type Indicator; v. Rotter's Internal-
External scale; and the VI. Bern Sex Role Inventory. The 
questionnaires were distributed to undergraduate students 
enrolled in an Introductory Psychology course taught by the 
researcher. The questionnaire took one and one-half 
50-minute class periods to complete. These classes augmented 
a section of course material that discussed psychological 
experimentation. Almost all of the questionnaires were 
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completed during the two presentation times. Subjects who 
were absent during class presentations were allowed to 
complete the questionnaire and return it to the investigator. 
Dependent Measures 
The dependent variable, moral perspective, was measured 
by two instruments. The care-based moral perspective was 
indexed by the Relationship Self Inventory (RSI; Reinhart 
et al., 1985). The justice-based moral perspective was 
measured by the Defining Issues Test (DIT; Rest et al., 
1974). 
Relationship Self Inventory. The Relationship Self 
Inventory was used to measure the care-based moral 
perspective. The RSI measures Gilligan's "connected self-in-
relation-to-others" construct (Gilligan, 1982; Reinhart 
et al., 1985). An individual's perceptions of being 
connected in his or her relations to others are based upon an 
orientation to the care of oneself and others. Gilligan's 
model suggests that manifestations of the connected self are 
associated primarily with women. The RSI consists of 27 
potentially self-descriptive statements arranged in four 
scales which are internally consistent, acceptably reliable 
at all ages, and measure Gilligan's model of the connected 
self and orientation to care. The four scales are: 
1) Primacy of Self Care; 2) Primacy of Other Care; 3) Primacy 
of Both Self and Other Care; and the 4) Connected Self. All 
four scales were administered in the present study. However, 
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the fourth scale, Connected Self, was not necessary for the 
purposes of the present study. Data regarding the Connected 
Self scale were saved for later analyses. Scale reliability 
for the Primacy of Self Care scale is .74; that for the 
Primacy of Other Care scale is .64; that for the Primacy of 
Both Self and Other scale is .65; and that for the Connected 
Self scale is .75 (Reinhart et al., 1985). The possible 
score range for the Primacy of Self Care scale is 0 to 25. 
Possible scores for the Primacy of Other Care scale range 
from 0 to 35. The possible score range for the Primacy of 
Both Self and Other care scale is between 0 and 40. That for 
the Connected Self scale is between 0 and 35. 
As a psychological construct, the connected self is 
formed on the basis of an orientation to care of self and 
others. Relationships are viewed as being engaged in 
through activities of care in response to others, which stems 
from a belief in the interconnectedness of people. 
Gilligan's research (1982) suggests that for women whose self 
is developed through connection with others, there are three 
groups who are differentiated by three meanings of 
care of self and others: 1) Caring for oneself is necessary 
because others will not care; 2) Caring for others takes 
precedence over caring for oneself; and 3) Caring for all, 
including self, is important. These three meanings reflect 
three different forms of the connected self and serve as the 
basis for three of the four RSI scales (Reinhart et al., 
1985). The three meanings also reflect the three levels of 
the care perspective of moral reasoning. 
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Within the lowest level of the care perspective, Primacy 
of Self Care, moral reasoning reflects a deep and concerted 
interest in insuring that one's own needs are met first 
before other's needs are addressed. At the second level, 
Primacy of Other care, moral reasoning is based upon the 
notion that one must address the needs of others prior to 
addressing one's own needs. At the highest level of the care 
perspective, Primacy of Both Self and Other Care, moral 
reasoning indicates an awareness of the necessity of 
addressing one's own and others' needs with equal 
consideration. Because the three RSI scales index the three 
levels of the connected self, it was used to measure the 
care-based moral ethic in this study. 
Defining Issues Test. The Defining Issues Test was used 
to assess the justice-based moral perspective. The DIT is a 
widely used objective test of moral reasoning in which 
subjects are requested to isolate the critical issues in six 
dilemmas, each of which describes an interpersonal problem 
encountered by a hypothetical other. In addition to scores 
which reveal the level of moral development, the DIT provides 
a P-s~ore that measures the degree to which subjects consider 
principled, Level 3, responses important in resolving moral 
problems (Lanky et al., 1988). The objective in the DIT is 
to pick the issue that makes the most difference in deciding 
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what action one ought to take in response to a moral dilemma. 
The basis for this procedure is that people's judgments of 
the crucial issue of moral dilemmas change with development 
as does their moral reasoning itself (Rest et al., 1974). 
In the current study, the DIT was used to determine subjects' 
level of moral reasoning. Possible scores range from 0 to 95 
for each of the levels of moral development. 
The correlation between the DIT P-score and Kohlberg's 
Postconventional stage score is .68 (Rest et al., 1974). 
However, the DIT has come to be the standard objective 
pencil-and-paper instrument used to assess moral development 
(Locke & Tucker, 1988; Lanky et al., 1988; Ford & Lowery, 
1986; Rybash et al., 1981). The DIT P-score has a test-
retest Pearson correlation of .81 (Rest et al., 1974). 
As a psychological construct, the justice-based moral 
perspective orientation is divided into three hierarchical 
levels. At the Preconventional, the first and lowest level 
of justice-based moral reasoning, the moral quality of an 
activity is determined by what the action will do for the 
protection of one's rights which are based upon explicit or 
implicit social rules. Within the second level, 
Conventional, moral decisions are made on the basis of 
established authority which has determined rules for the 
protection of the rights of all members of their society. At 
this level, morality is demonstrated by obeying the law that 
governs every citizen's behavior in its efforts to protect 
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every citizen's rights. At the highest level of the Justice 
Perspective, Postconventional, the basis for moral decisions 
are principles. Deduced by the individual, these principles 
reflect a concern for the rights of all living beings to 
dignity and to acceptable levels of welfare. Together the 
three levels comprise the justice perspective. 
Independent Measures 
The present study investigated the relationship between 
three independent variables (personality type, locus of 
control orientation, and sex role orientation) and moral 
perspective. Personality type was assessed by means of the 
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. Locus of control orientation 
was measured via Rotter's Internal-External Scale. Sex role 
orientation was indexed by the Bern Sex Role Inventory. 
Myers-Briqqs Type Indicator. The self-scoring Short 
Form G of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) was used to 
index personality type (Myers & McCaulley, 1985). The MBTI 
measures responses on four scales and identifies one as 
having one of sixteen specific personality types. The MBTI 
is based upon Jung's theory of psychological types (Jung, 
1933). This instrument divides personalities into sixteen 
types based upon four pairs of interactive factors: 
1) extroversion or introversion; 2) sensing or intuiting; 
3) thinking or feeling; and, 4) judging or perceiving. Each 
pair of factors is conceptualized as a dimension with the two 
factors within a pair serving as its extremes. Individuals 
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are conceived as having preferences for engaging in 
activities related to one extreme in a dimension more so than 
its opposite. 
Internal reliability derived from product-moment 
correlations of continuous scores of traditional college 
students with Spearman-Brown prophesy formula correction are 
.83 for the extroversion-introversion (E-I) scale; .82 for 
the sensing-intuiting (S-N) scale; .81 for the thinking-
feeling (T-F) scale; and .86 for the judging-perceiving (J-P) 
scale. Twenty-one month test-retest reliability for the E-I 
scale is .78; .73 for the S-N scale; .67 for the T-F scale; 
and .64 for the J-P scale (Myers & McCaulley, 1985). Neither 
individual scale reliabilities nor overall test reliability 
could be computed for the responses of subjects in the 
present study due to the transformations that were performed 
in determining the final personality types. 
The MBTI typology was simplified by reducing the sixteen 
types to four temperaments, the Epimethean, the Apollonian, 
the Dionysian, and the Promethean which are based upon Jung•s 
(1933) four orienting functions (Keirsey & Bates, 1984). 
The Greek mythological-based temperaments were renamed the 
Legalist, the Empathist, the Realist, and the Analyst, 
respectively for further simplification (RoBards, 1986). 
Each of these temperaments can be expressed as four separate 
specific personalities. Robards' (1986) method was used to 
transform the MBTI results into individuals' specific 
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personality type. Statistical analyses were used to 
determine the relationship between personality type and moral 
perspective. 
Rotter's Internal-External Scale. Locus of control 
orientation was measured by Rotter's Internal-External Scale 
(I/E Scale). The I/E scale was devised to assess an 
individual's degree of perceived control within his 
environment. Rotter (1966) noted that the effect of a 
specific reinforcement depends upon whether or not the 
individual perceives a contingency relationship between his 
response and the reinforcer. This perception was identified 
as "generalized expectancy", conceptualized as a belief in 
internal as opposed to external control over reinforcement. 
Perceived control is formulated as a continuum with the 
constructs "internal control" and "external control" as its 
extremes. Individuals who are identified as having internal 
control over reinforcement perceive that their own actions 
control the consequences that they experience and are 
identified by low I/E scores. On the other hand, persons who 
perceive that consequences are determined by forces beyond 
their control are classified as externals and are identified 
by high I/E scores. According to Rotter (1973), reliability 
coefficients using the Kuder-Richardson formula range from 
.70 to .76. One month test-retest reliability ranges from 
.60 to .83. Individual scale reliabilities were computed 
for the I/E instrument in the present study. Cronbach's 
alpha for the internal scale was .72; that for the external 
scale was .69. 
42 
Locus of control was determined by the I/E Scale as 
follows. Subjects were presented 29 pairs of statements and 
asked to select the one within each pair that they consider 
to be more true. A pair consisted of a statement which 
reflected an orientation toward external control and one 
which reflected an orientation toward internal control. For 
example, one pair of statements which was presented to 
subjects was: A) Many of the unhappy things in people's 
lives are partly due to bad luck.; and B) People's 
misfortunes result from the mistakes they make. A subject's 
score was his or her total number of external choices. A 
belief in external control was indicated by high scores 
whereas a belief in internal control was indicated by low 
scores. Statistical analyses were used to determine the 
relationship between locus of control orientation and moral 
perspective. 
Bern Sex Role Inventory. Sex role orientation was 
determined through the Bern Sex Role Inventory (BSRI). The 
BSRI was designed as a means of indexing individuals by 
gender using psychological sex role rather than biological 
sex. It consists of sixty personality characteristics, 20 of 
which are considered "masculine", 20 that are considered 
"feminine", and 20 that are considered neutral, but socially 
desirable. According to Bern (1974), internal reliability of 
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scores for the three BSRI scales: 1) Masculinity; 
2) Femininity; and 3) Social Desirability (Bern, 1974). 
Results indicated that all three scales are highly reliable 
(Masculinity = .86; Femininity = .80; Social Desirability = 
.75). The one-month test-retest reliability also is high 
(Masculinity = .90; Femininity = .90; and Social Desirability 
= .89). Individual scale reliabilities were computed for the 
the masculine scale was .85; that for the feminine scale was 
.83; and that for the social desirability scale was .49. 
The BSRI identified individuals through self-description 
as either Masculine, Feminine, Androgynous, or 
Undifferentiated. Individuals indicated an identification 
with descriptors which are stereotypically associated with 
males or with females. Persons who showed a predominant 
identification with stereotyped masculine descriptors were 
identified as having a masculine sex role orientation. 
Similarly, individuals who indicated a marked identification 
with stereotyped feminine descriptors were viewed as having a 
feminine sex role orientation. Persons who showed a strong 
identification with both masculine and feminine descriptors 
were labelled Androgynous. And those who indicated a weak 
identification with both masculine and feminine descriptor 
were designated as Undifferentiated. The value of the BSRI 
lies in its ability to reflect gender differences that may be 
the result of the influence of social learning. Statistical 
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analyses were used to determine the relationship between sex 
role orientation and moral perspective. 
Statistical Analysis 
Each of the six hypotheses was tested by multiple 
discriminant analyses. Discriminant analysis is a 
statistical technique in which linear combinations of 
variables are used to differentiate two or more categories or 
groups. In the present study linear combinations of 
personality type, locus of control orientation, and sex role 
orientation were used to distinguish between the two moral 
perspectives. Due to the exploratory nature of the current 
study, the stepwise method was used to select the linear 
combination that best discriminated between moral 
perspectives (Nie et al.1975). The default tolerance level 
(.001) for inclusion of a variable in the stepwise method 
was used. All variables were tested against this level prior 
to inclusion. The tolerance of a variable in the analysis at 
any given step was the proportion of its within-groups 
variance not accounted for by other variables in the 
analysis. 
The data were inspected to determine that two important 
assumptions of multiple discriminant analysis were met: 
1) the assumption of comparable group sizes; and, 2) the 
assumption of no unacceptable outliers (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
1983, pp. 335-340). An examination of sample variances for 
the ten predictor variables revealed no large discrepancies. 
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Discriminant analysis procedures are robust enough to handle 
observed discrepancies. Data for twelve subjects at the care 
ethic and four subjects at the justice ethic were eliminated 
by casewise deletion because of missing information. For 
purposes of the multiple discriminant analyses, the major 
variables in this study were addressed in the following ways: 
Dependent Variable 
There were two distinct moral perspectives to be 
examined by this investigation: a care-based moral 
perspective (Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; Gilligan, 1982) and 
a justice-based moral perspective (Gilligan, Brown & Rogers, 
1990, Kohlberg, 1981). Each perspective consisted of three 
hierarchical levels contained within it. Each of the six 
levels was analyzed by a discriminant procedure. 
Care Perspective. The care perspective was assessed by 
Reinhart et al.'s (1985) Relationship Self Inventory. The 
three levels within the care-based perspective from lowest to 
highest level are: 1) Primacy of Self Care; 2) Primacy of 
Other Care; and 3) Primacy of Both Self and Other Care. 
Justice Perspective. The justice perspective was 
measured by Rest et al.'s (1974) Defining Issues Test. The 
three levels within the justice-based Perspective from lowest 
to highest are: 1) Preconventional; 2) Conventional; and 3) 
Postconventional. 
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Independent Variables 
Personality. The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (Myers & 
McCaulley, 1985) was used to determine subjects' personality 
type. Subjects' responses on the MBTI designated them as 
extroverted or introverted, and sensing or intuitive, and 
thinking or feeling, and judging or perceiving. The MBTI 
score was a four letter designation which identified each 
subject's specific MBTI personality type. Subjects were 
then classified according to Robards' (1986) personality 
typology (Legalist, Empathist, Realist, Analyst). Thus, 
individuals who were intuitive and feeling were indexed as 
Ernpathists; those who were intuitive and thinking were 
catagorized as analysts; persons who were sensing and 
judging were grouped as Legalists; and, subjects who were 
sensing and perceiving were classified as Realists. 
Each of the four possible personality temperaments were 
dichotomized into a dummy variable, e. g. as represented by 
the quality or not. The referent variable was having the 
personality temperament. This process resulted in four 
dummied variables: Empathist, Analyst, Legalist, and Realist. 
In the first, second, and fourth analyses, Empathist, 
Analyst, and Realist were coded 1 and the referent, Legalist, 
was coded 0. In the third, fifth, and sixth analysis, 
Legalist, Realist, and Analyst were coded 1 and the referent, 
Empathist, was coded 0. 
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Locus of Control. Locus of control orientation was 
measured by Rotter's Internal-External Scale (I/E). A belief 
in external control was indicated by high scores whereas a 
belief in internal control was indicated by low scores. 
Sex Role Orientation. The Bern Sex Role Inventory (Bern, 
1974) was used to measure sex role orientation. Subjects' 
responses on the BSRI identified them as having a masculine, 
a feminine, an androgynous, or an undifferentiated sex role 
orientation. Each of the four possible psychological sex 
roles was dummy coded. The referent variable in each case 
was having, versus not having, the sex role orientation. 
There were a total of four dummied, dichotomized sex role 
orientations: masculine, feminine, androgynous, and 
undifferentiated. In the first and second analyses, 
feminine, androgynous, and undifferentiated were coded 1 and 
the referent, masculine, was coded 0. In the third, fourth, 
and sixth analyses, masculine, androgynous, and 
undifferentiated are coded 1 and the referent, feminine, was 
coded 0. In the fifth analysis, masculine, feminine, and 
androgynous were coded 1 and the referent, undifferentiated 
was coded 0. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
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The first part of this chapter includes descriptive data 
of the young adults who comprised the research sample for the 
study. These data are followed by the results of the 
discriminant analyses performed for each of the six 
hypotheses. 
Description of the Sample 
The demographic data for 134 subjects out of the 
original research sample of 243 are presented in Table 1. As 
noted in Chapter II, only the data obtained from white 
college transfer students between the ages of 18 and 25 were 
appropriate for the purposes of the present study. Data for 
the remaining subjects will be saved for later analyses. 
The mean age of the final sample group of 134 was 20 
years (Table 1). Women comprised 53 percent of this sample, 
and men 47 percent. Ninety-four percent were single, 4 
percent were married, and 2 percent were divorced. Eighty-
seven percent were employed. The mean range of hours worked 
each week was from 20 to 30 hours. Eighty-four percent lived 
with parents or family. Of these, forty-five percent relied 
upon parents or family for more than one-half of their 
financial support (not shown in Table 1). Eighteen percent 
reported that they did not have enough money for necessities; 
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fifty-seven percent said they had enough if they were 
careful; twenty-five percent reported having enough money for 
everything they needed. The mean level of subjects' mothers' 
education was one year of college. The mean level of 
subjects' fathers' education was two years of college. The 
mean range of household income was $41,000 to $55,999. 
Table 1 
Selected Demographic Characteristics of Young Adult Sample 
(!i = 134) 
Characteristics n 
Age 
18 26 19.4 
19 34 25.4 
20 32 23.9 
21 15 11.2 
22 8 6.0 
23 4 3.0 
24 9 6.7 
25 6 4.4 
Total 134 Mean Age 
Gender 
Men 63 47.0 
Women 71 53.0 
Total 134 
20 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Characteristics n % 
Marital Status 
Single 126 94.0 
Married 6 4.5 
Divorced 2 1.5 
Total 134 
Employment Status 
Employed 117 87.3 
Unemployed 17 12.7 
Total 134 
Hours Worked Per Week 
None 17 12.7 
0 - 20 39 29.1 
21 - 30 49 36.6 
31 - 40 23 17.2 
More than 40 5 3.7 
Missing Data 1 .7 
Total 134 
Mean Hours 21 - 40 
Living Arrangements 
With Parents or Family 112 83.6 
Alone or With Roomate(s) 22 16.4 
Total 134 
Table 1 (continued) 
Characteristics 
Discretionary Funds 
Not Enough for Necessities 
Enough for Necessities if Careful 
Enough for Necessities 
Total 
Parents' Education 
Mothers' Education 
Below 9th grade 
Completed lOth grade 
Completed 12th grade 
Completed 1 year college 
completed 2 years college 
Completed 4 years college 
Beyond 2 years college 
Total 
Mean Mothers' Education 
24 
77 
33 
134 
2 
5 
56 
17 
22 
24 
8 
134 
Completed 
% 
17.9 
57.5 
24.6 
1.4 
3.7 
41.8 
12.7 
16.4 
17.9 
6.0 
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1 year college 
Table 1 (continued) 
Characteristics 
Fathers' Education 
Below 9th grade 
Completed lOth grade 
Completed 12th grade 
Completed 1 year college 
Completed 2 years college 
Completed 4 years college 
Beyond 4 years collegee 
Missing Data 
Total 
Mean Fathers' Education 
Annual Household Income 
Below $10,000 
$10,000 - $25,999 
$26,000 - $40,999 
$41,000 - $55,999 
$56,000 - $70,999 
$71,000 - $76,000 
More than $76,000 
Missing Data 
Total 
Mean Household Income 
3 
11 
37 
13 
15 
34 
24 
2 
134 
% 
2.2 
8.2 
27.6 
9.7 
11.2 
25.4 
17.9 
1.5 
52 
Completed 2 years college 
13 
19 
22 
24 
21 
5 
13 
17 
134 
9.7 
14.1 
16.4 
17.9 
15.7 
3.7 
9.6 
12.7 
$41,000 - $55,999 
53 
Table 2 presents a summary of the classification of 
subjects with respect to the independent variables 
(personality type, locus of control orientation, and sex role 
orientation) and the dependent variables (care-based moral 
perspective and justice-based moral perspective) in the 
study. Nineteen percent of the subjects had Analyst 
personalities; 25 percent were Empathists, 25 percent were 
Realists; and 31 percent were Legalists. Thirty-six percent 
had external locus of control orientations, while 64 percent 
were internals. Thirteen percent were masculine; 16 percent 
had a feminine sex role orientation; 70 percent had an 
androgynous sex role orientation; and 1 percent had an 
undifferentiated sex role orientation. 
Results indicated that 25 percent reasoned morally at 
the first level of the care-based moral perspective ("Primacy 
of Self care"); 62 percent reasoned at the second level 
("Primacy of Other care"); and 4 percent reasoned morally at 
the third level ("Primacy of Both Self and Other Care"). 
Seventy-five percent were reasoning at the second level of 
the justice-based moral perspective (Conventional) while 25 
percent reasoned morally at the third (Postconventional). 
None of the subjects in the study reasoned at the first level 
of the justice moral perspective. Thus, subjects were 
approximately 1/2 men (47%) and 1/2 (53%) women (Table 1), 
but nearly 3/4 (70%) had androgynous sex roles. In addition, 
they were nearly evenly distributed among the four 
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personality types, but nearly 2/3 (64%) had internal, as 
opposed to external (36%), locus of control orientations. 
Also, the Relationship Self Inventory (used to index the care 
ethic) is more sensitive than the Defining Issues Test (used 
to index the justice ethic) in measuring the lowest levels of 
moral reasoning. However, the DIT is more sensitive than the 
RSI in measuring the highest levels of moral decision making. 
Table 2 
Classification of Subjects According to Personality Type, 
Locus of Control Orientation, Sex Role Orientation, and 
Care-based and Justice-based Moral Perspectives 
Variables % 
Independent Variables 
Personality Type 
Analyst 25 18.7 
Empathist 34 25.4 
Realist 34 25.4 
Legalist 41 30.5 
Locus of Control Orientation 
External 48 35.8 
Internal 86 64.2 
Table 2 (continued) 
Variables !l % 
Sex Role Orientation 
Masculine 18 13.4 
Feminine 21 15.7 
Androgynous 94 70.1 
Undifferentiated 1 .7 
Dependent Variables 
Care-based Moral Perspective 
Self Care-Level 1 34 25.4 
Other Care-Level 2 83 61.9 
Self and Other Care-Level 3 5 3.7 
Missing Data 12 9.0 
Justice-based Moral Perspective 
Preconventional-Level 1 0 o.o 
Conventional-Level 2 96 71.6 
Postconventional-Level 3 34 25.4 
Missing Data 4 3.0 
Predictors of Levels of Care-based Moral Perspective 
The similar nature of Hypotheses I and II allowed the 
testing of both with one stepwise discriminant analysis. 
Hypothesis I predicted that persons classified at the third 
level of the care-based moral perspective ("Primacy of Both 
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Self and Other Care") would have Empathist and Analyst 
personalities with an internal locus of control orientation, 
and with feminine and androgynous sex role orientations. 
Hypothesis II predicted that individuals classified at the 
second level of the care-based moral perspective ("Primacy of 
Other Care") would have Empathist and Analyst personalities 
with an external locus of control orientation, and with 
feminine and androgynous sex role orientations. 
Hypotheses I and II 
Hypotheses I and II were partially confirmed by the 
first stepwise discriminant analysis. The overall ~ for the 
model was significant,~ (8, 232) = 4.50, E < .001 (Table 3). 
Group classification results of the discriminant 
analysis testing Hypotheses I and II are presented in Table 
4. Approximately 60 percent of all grouped cases were 
correctly classified by the discriminant model. Forty-seven 
percent of the subjects in the group reasoning at level one 
("Primacy of Self Care") of the care-based moral perspective 
were correctly predicted. Sixty-four percent of those 
reasoning at the second level ("Primacy of Other Care") were 
correctly predicted. Eighty percent of those subjects 
reasoning at the third moral level ("Primacy of Both Self and 
Other Care") were correctly predicted. Thus membership at 
the third moral reasoning level could be better predicted 
than membership at the second or first levels, while that at 
the second could be better predicted than that at the first. 
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Table 3 
Standardized Discriminant Coefficients (By Function) 
Distinguishing Levels of the Care-based Moral Perspective by 
Personality Type, Locus of Control, and Sex Role Orientation 
Functions 
Explained Variance 
% 
Function 1 70.61 
Personality Type 
Analyst/Legalist 
Empathist/Legalist 
Sex Role Orhmtation 
Androgynous/Masculine 
Locus of Control Orientation 
External/Internal 
Function 2 29.39 
Locus of Control Orientation 
External/Internal 
Sex Role Orientation 
Androgynous/Masculine 
Personality Type 
Analyst/Legalist 
Total 100.00 
F (8, 232) = 4.50, p < .001. 
Discriminant 
Coefficients 
-.88 
.58 
.52 
.28 
-.81 
. 67 
.52 
Table 4 
Group Classification Results: 
Discriminant Analysis Testing Hypotheses I and II; 
Levels of Care-based Moral Perspective 
Levels of 
Care 
Perspective 
Level 1 
Level 2 
Level 3 
11 
No. of 
Cases 
34 
83 
5 
Level 1 
16 
23 
1 
% 
47.1 
27.7 
20.0 
Predicted Groups 
Level 2 
n 
12 
53 
0 
% 
35.3 
63.9 
o.o 
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Level 3 
6 
7 
4 
% 
17.6 
8.4 
80.0 
Percent of all grouped cases correctly classified = 59.8% 
..... 
Number of subjects, out of the original 134, on whom there 
were complete data. 
A summary of the canonical discriminant functions 
evaluated at the group means (group centroids) is presented 
in Table 5. 
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Table 5 
Canonical Discriminant Functions Evaluated at Group Means or 
Centroids: Discriminant Analysis Testing Hypotheses I and II 
Levels of Care-based 
Moral Perspective 
Primacy of Self Care-Level 1 
Primacy of Other Care-Level 2 
Primacy of Both Self and Other 
Care-Level 3 
Functions 
1 
-.12 
.18 
-2.16 
2 
-.48 
.17 
.41 
Functions. Two functions were identified by the first 
multiple discriminant analysis (Table 3). The first function 
was the more important of the two. It explained 
approximately 71 percent of the total variance explained and 
distinguished subjects at level three from those at levels 
one and two of the care-based moral perspective. Persons at 
level one were distinguished from those at level two by this 
function, but by relatively little and appeared to be very 
similar (Table 5). 
Function one variables, as shown in Table 3, in order of 
their discriminating abilities (standardized discriminant 
coefficients) were the Analyst versus Legalist personality 
type (-.88), the Empathist versus Legalist personality type 
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(.58), and the androgynous versus masculine sex role 
orientation (.52). This function distinguished between 
subjects at different levels primarily on the basis of 
personality type, to a lesser degree on the basis of sex role 
orientation, and to a much lesser degree by locus of control 
orientation. 
The second function explained approximately 29 percent 
of the total variance explained by the model and 
distinguished between subjects at levels one and three of the 
care-based moral perspective. Persons at level two were 
distinguished from those at levels one and three, but to a 
lesser extent (Table 4). 
Function two variables in order of their discriminating 
abilities were locus of control orientation (-.81), 
androgynous versus masculine sex role orientation (.67), and 
the Analyst versus Legalist personality type (.52). This 
function distinguished between subjects at different levels 
primarily on the basis of locus of control orientation and to 
a lesser degree on the basis of sex role orientation and 
personality type. 
Hypothesis I. Hypothesis I predicted that persons 
classified at the third level of the care-based moral 
perspective ("Primacy of Both Self and Other Care") would 
have Empathist and Analyst personalities with an internal 
locus of control orientation, and with feminine and 
androgynous sex role orientations. Function one offered 
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partial confirmation of this hypothesis. According to this 
function, persons at level three (those concerned with the 
welfare of both self and others) were distinguished from 
those at level one (those concerned with their own welfare) 
and those at level two (those concerned primarily with the 
welfare of others) primarily on the basis of personality type 
and sex role orientation, and to a much lesser degree by 
locus of control orientation. These results indicated that 
individuals at level three rather than those at levels one or 
two were Analysts (logical, theoretical, intuitive, and 
creative) and Empathists (warm, having values based upon 
responsibility in relationships) as opposed to being 
Legalists (conservative, conceptually restricted, and rule-
followers). 
In addition, subjects at the third rather than the 
first or second levels tended to identify with an androgynous 
as opposed to a masculine sex role orientation. However, 
according to function one, persons at level three as opposed 
to levels one or two had external rather than internal locus 
of control orientations. This finding was contrary to the 
expectation posited in Hypothesis I. Function one failed to 
provide support for the expectation that individuals at level 
three would have feminine sex role orientations. The 
feminine versus masculine variable was not a significant 
discriminator in this function. 
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Function two also offered partial confirmation of 
Hypothesis I. According to this function, persons at level 
three were distinguished from those at level one and those at 
level two primarily on the basis of locus of control 
orientation and sex role orientation, and to a lesser degree 
by personality type. These results indicated that 
individuals at level three rather than those at levels one or 
two had internal rather than external locus of control 
orientations. They tended to believe that personal 
consequences are determined by personal behavior as opposed 
to external, environmental forces. This indication 
contrasted with that of function one which differentiated 
groups primarily on the basis of personality type. 
Function two suggested that individuals at level three 
rather than at level one tended to identify with a masculine 
as opposed to an androgynous sex role orientation. This 
finding was contrary to the expectation posited in 
Hypothesis I. Function two failed to provide support for the 
expectation that individuals at level three would have 
feminine sex role orientations. The feminine versus 
masculine variable was not a significant discriminator in 
this function. 
Function two also indicated that individuals at level 
three rather than at levels one or two were Legalists as 
opposed to being Analysts. This finding also was contrary to 
the expectation posited in Hypothesis I. Function two failed 
to provide support for the expectation that individuals at 
level three would have Empathist personality types. The 
Empathist versus Legalist variable was not a significant 
discriminator in this function. 
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In summary, the main findings of the first analysis 
supported the expectations of Hypothesis I. The data showed 
that young adults at level three of the care-based moral 
perspective were more likely to be distinguishable by 
personality type and sex role orientation than by locus of 
control orientation. Under this distinction they were likely 
to be Empathists and Analysts rather than Legalists. In 
addition they were likely to have androgynous as opposed to 
masculine sex role orientations. They were also likely to be 
externally rather than internally controlling. 
On the other hand, and to a lesser extent, when 
reasoning at level three rather than at levels one or two was 
primarily a function of locus of control orientation, young 
adults were likely to be Legalists rather than Empathists or 
Analysts. They were likely to have masculine as opposed to 
androgynous sex role orientations. In addition they were 
likely to be internally rather than externally controlling. 
Finally, no support was found for the expectation that 
young adults with feminine sex role orientations would reason 
morally at level three of the care perspective. 
Hypothesis II. Hypothesis II predicted that individuals 
classified at the second level of the care-based moral 
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perspective ("Primacy of Other Care") would have Empathist 
and Analyst personalities with an external locus of control 
orientation, and with feminine and androgynous sex role 
orientations. Function one failed to offer support for the 
second hypothesis. According to this function, persons at 
level three (those concerned with the welfare of both self 
and others) were distinguished from those at level one (those 
concerned with their own welfare) and those at level two 
(those concerned mainly with the welfare of others) primarily 
on the basis of personality type and sex role orientation, 
and to a much lesser degree by locus of control orientation. 
The first function indicated that persons at level two rather 
than those at level three were Legalists (conservative, 
conceptually restricted rule-followers) as opposed to being 
Analysts (logical, theoretical, intuitive, and creative) or 
as to being Empathists (warm, communicative, and interested 
in values based upon responsibility within relationships). 
This finding was contrary to the expectation posited in 
Hypothesis II. 
According to function one subjects at level two rather 
than those at level three tended to display masculine as 
opposed to androgynous characteristics. This finding was 
also contrary to the expectation posited in Hypothesis II. 
Function one failed to provide support for the expectation 
that individuals at level three would have feminine sex role 
·rier1tations. The feminine versus masculine variable was not 
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a significant discriminator. 
Function one also indicated that individuals at level 
two as opposed to level three were internally rather than 
externally controlled. This finding was also contrary to the 
expectation posited in Hypothesis II. 
Function two also failed to provide support for 
Hypothesis II. According to this function, persons at level 
three were distinguished from those at level one and those at 
level two primarily on the basis of locus of control 
orientation and sex role orientation, and to a lesser degree 
by personality type. It distinguished between subjects at 
levels one and three of the care-based moral perspective 
(Table 5). Since Hypothesis II posited predictions about 
level two, function two of the first model failed to address 
any of its posits. 
In summary, the first discriminant analysis failed to 
support Hypothesis II. The data showed that young 
adults at level two of the care-based moral perspective 
were more likely to be distinguishable by personality type 
and sex role orientation than by locus of control 
orientation. When grouped by personality individuals at 
level two were likely to be Legalists rather than Empathists 
and Analysts. In addition they were likely to have masculine 
as opposed to androgynous sex role orientations. No support 
was found for the expectation that young adults with feminine 
sex role orientations would reason morally at level two of 
the care perspective. Also, when classified by personality 
type, persons were also likely to be internally controlling 
rather than externally controlled. 
Hypothesis III 
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Hypothesis III was partially confirmed by the second 
discriminant analysis. Table 6 indicates that the overall r 
for the model was significant, ~ (10, 230) = 3.62, E < .001. 
Group classification results of the discriminant 
analysis testing Hypotheses III are presented in Table 7. 
Approximately 62 percent of all grouped cases were correctly 
classified by the discriminant equation. Fifty percent of 
the subjects in the group reasoning at level one ("Primacy of 
Self Care") of the care-based moral perspective were 
correctly predicted. Sixty-six percent of those reasoning at 
the second level ("Primacy of Other care") were correctly 
predicted. Eighty percent of those subjects reasoning at the 
third moral level ("Primacy of Both Self and Other Care") 
were correctly predicted. Thus, membership at the third 
moral reasoning level could be better predicted than that at 
the second or first levels. Membership at the second level 
could be better predicted than that at the first level. 
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Table 6 
Standardized Discriminant Coefficients (By Function) 
Distinguishing Levels of the Care-based Moral Perspective by 
Locus of Control, sex Role Orientation, and Personality Type 
Functions 
Function 1 
Personality Type 
Analyst/Empathist 
Sex Role Orientation 
Androgynous/Feminine 
Function 2 
Explained Variance 
% 
69.62 
29.39 
Locus of Control Orientation 
External/Internal 
Sex Role Orientation 
Masculine/Feminine 
Androgynous/Feminine 
Personality Type 
Legalist/Empathist 
Analyst/Empathist 
Total 100.00 
F (10, 230) = 3.62, ~ < .001. 
Discriminant 
Coefficients 
-.84 
.55 
.83 
.70 
-.64 
.64 
-.54 
Table 7 
Group Classification Results: 
Discriminant Analysis Testing Hypothesis III; 
Levels of Care-based Moral Perspective 
Levels of Predicted Groups 
p... 
Care No. of Level 1 Level 2 
Perspective Cases % % 
68 
Level 3 
% 
Level 1 
Level 2 
Level 3 
34 
83 
5 
17 
21 
0 
50.0 
25.3 
00.0 
12 
55 
1 
35.3 
66.3 
20.0 
5 
7 
4 
14.7 
8.4 
80.0 
Percent of all grouped cases correctly classified= 62.3 
"-
Number of subjects, out of the original 134, on whom there 
were complete data. 
A summary of the canonical discriminant functions 
evaluated at the group means (group centroids) is presented 
in Table 8. 
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Table 8 
Canonical Discriminant Functions Evaluated at Group Means or 
Centroids: Discriminant Analysis Testing HyPothesis III 
Levels of Care-based 
Moral Perspective 
Functions 
Primacy of Self Care-Level 1 
Primacy of Other Care-Level 2 
Primacy of Both Self and Other 
Care-Level 3 
1 
-.12 
.18 
-2.16 
Functions. Two functions were identified by the 
2 
.49 
-.17 
-.42 
second discriminant analysis (Table 6). The first function 
was the more important of the two. It explained 
approximately 70 percent of the total variance explained and 
distinguished subjects at level three from those at levels 
one and two of the care-based moral perspective. Persons at 
level one were distinguished from those at level two by this 
function, but by relatively little and appeared to be very 
similar (Table 8). 
Function one variables (Table 6) in order of their 
dis~riminating abilities were the Analyst versus Empathist 
petl·O~ality type (-.84), and the Androgynous versus Feminine 
sex ole orientation (.55). This function distinguished 
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between subjects at different levels of the care-based moral 
perspective primarily on the basis of personality type and to 
a lesser extent on sex role orientation. 
The second function explained approximately 30 percent 
of the total variance explained by the model and 
distinguished between subjects at levels one and three of the 
care-based moral perspective. It also distinguished persons 
at level two from those at levels one and three, but to a 
lesser extent than it did in distinguishing individuals at 
levels one and three (Table 8). 
Function two variables in order of their discriminating 
abilities were locus of control orientation (.83), masculine 
versus feminine sex role orientation (.70), androgynous 
versus feminine sex role orientation (-.64), the Legalist 
versus Empathist personality type (.64), and the Analyst 
versus Empathist personality type (-.54). This function 
distinguished between subjects at different levels of the 
care-based moral perspective primarily on the basis of locus 
of control orientation and to a lesser degree on the basis of 
sex role orientation and personality type. 
HyPothesis III. Hypothesis III predicted that persons 
classified at the first level of the care-based moral 
perspc;:c::tive ("Primacy of Self Care") would have Legalist and 
Realisl personalities with an internal locus of control 
ol."ien· .:tt.i~n, and with masculine and androgynous sex role 
ori· t ·.tions. Function one offered partial support for this 
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hypothesis. According to this function, persons at level one 
(those concerned with their own welfare) were distinguished 
from those at level three (those concerned with the welfare 
of both self and others) primarily on the basis of 
personality type and sex role orientation, and to a much 
lesser degree by locus of control orientation. These results 
indicated that individuals at level one rather than at level 
three were Empathists (warm, having values based upon 
responsibility in relationships) rather than Analysts 
(logical, theoretical, intuitive, and creative) or Legalists 
(conservative, conceptually restricted, and rule-
followers). These findings were contrary to the expectations 
posited in Hypothesis III. Function one failed to provide 
support for the expectation that individuals at level one 
would have Realist personality types. The Realist versus 
Empathist variable was not a significant discriminator in 
this function. 
In addition, persons at the first level rather than at 
the third level tended to identify with feminine rather than 
either androgynous or masculine sex role orientations. These 
findings were contrary to the expectations posited in 
Hypothesis III. However, persons at level one had internal 
rather than external locus of control orientations. This 
finding was consistent with the expectation posed in 
Hypothesis III. 
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Function two also offered partial support for Hypothesis 
III. According to this function, individuals at level one 
were distinguished from those at level three primarily on the 
basis of locus of control orientation and sex role 
orientation, and to a lesser degree by personality type. 
These results indicated that persons concerned primarily 
with their own welfare (level one) rather than those 
concerned with the welfare of others as well as their own 
(level three) had internal rather than external locus of 
control orientations. They tended to believe that personal 
consequences were determined by personal behavior as opposed 
to external, environmental forces. This support for 
Hypothesis III was consistent with that of function one which 
differentiated groups primarily on the basis of personality 
type. 
Function two also showed that subjects at level one as 
opposed to level three identified with feminine rather than 
masculine or androgynous sex role orientations. This finding 
was contrary to the expectations posited in Hypothesis III 
and consistent with the results indicated by function one. 
In addition function two indicated that young adults at 
level one rather than level three tended to be Empathists as 
opposed to Analysts or Legalists. These findings were also 
contrary to the expectations posited in Hypothesis III and 
consistent with the results indicated by function one. 
Function two failed to provide support for the expectation 
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that individuals at level one would have Realist personality 
types. The Realist versus Empathist variable was not a 
significant discriminator in this function. 
In summary, the second discriminant analysis offered 
partial support for Hypothesis III. The data indicated that 
young adults at level one of the care-based moral perspective 
were more likely to be distinguishable by personality type 
and sex role orientation than by locus of control 
orientation. However, when grouped either by personality or 
sex role, individuals at level one were likely to have 
internal rather than external locus of control orientations. 
Also, when classified either by personality or sex role, and 
contrary to expectations, young adults at level one were 
likely to be Empathists rather than Analysts or Legalists. 
No support was found for the expectation that individuals 
with Realist personalities would reason morally at level one 
of the care perspective. Finally under both distinctions, 
and also contrary to Hypothesis III, persons at level one 
identified with feminine rather than masculine or androgynous 
sex role orientations. 
Predictors of Levels of Justice-based Moral Perspective 
HyPothesis IV 
Hypothesis IV was partially supported by a third 
stepwise discriminant analysis. The overall ~ for the 
third stepwise discriminant analysis was significant, 
I (5, 124) = 4.77, ~ < .001 '~able 9). 
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Group classification results of the discriminant 
analysis testing Hypothesis IV are presented in Table 10. 
Approximately 69 percent of all grouped cases were correctly 
classified by the discriminant equation. Seventy-two percent 
of the subjects in the group reasoning at level two 
(Conventional) of the justice-based moral perspective were 
correctly predicted. Sixty-two percent of those reasoning at 
the third moral level (Postconventional) were correctly 
predicted. Thus membership at the second moral reasoning 
level could be better predicted than that at the third level. 
Table 9 
Standardized Discriminant Coefficients Distinguishing Levels 
of Justice-based Moral Perspective by Personality Type, 
Sex Role Orientation, and Locus of Control Orientation 
Function 
Explained Variance 
% 
Discriminant Function 
Personality Type 
Empathist/Legalist 
Realist/Legalist 
Sex Role Orientation 
Undifferentiated/Feminine 
Masculine/Feminine 
100.00 
Discriminant 
Coefficients 
-.96 
.80 
.58 
-.69 
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Table 9 (continued) 
Explained Variance Discriminant 
Function % Coefficients 
Locus of Control Orientation 
External/Internal 
Total 100.00 
F (5, 124) = 4.77, E < .001. 
Table 10 
Group Classification Results: 
Discriminant Analysis Testing Hypothesis IV; 
Levels of Justice-based Moral Perspective 
Levels of Predicted Groups 
()>... 
Justice No. of Level 2 Level 3 
Perspective 
Level 2 
Level 3 
Cases 
96 
34 
69 
13 
% 
71.9 
38.2 
n 
27 
21 
% 
28.1 
61.8 
.36 
Percent of all grouped cases correctly classified = 70.8% 
CA-
Number of subjects, out of the original 134, on whom 
there were complete data. 
A summary of the canonical discriminant function 
evaluated at the group means (group centroids) is presented 
in Table 11. 
Table 11 
Canonical Discriminant Function Evaluated at Group Means or 
Centroids: Discriminant Analysis Testinq Hypothesis IV 
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Levels of Justice-based 
Moral Perspective 
Discriminant 
Function 
Conventional - Level 2 
Postconventional - Level 3 
.26 
-.73 
Function. Only one function was identified by the third 
multiple discriminant analysis (Table 9). Therefore this 
one function explained 100 percent of the explained variance 
in the model. It distinguished subjects at level two from 
those at level three of the justice-based moral perspective. 
None of the 134 young adults were classified as reasoning at 
level one of this moral perspective (Table 11). 
The function variables (Table 9) in order of their 
discJiminating abilities were the Empathist versus Legalist 
pers ·mali· y type (-. 96) , the Realist versus Legalist 
persc--•:o.li ty type ( . 80) , the masculine versus feminine sex 
role o ·: ~ntation (-.69), the undifferentiated versus feminine 
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sex role orientation (.58), and locus of control orientation 
(.36). This function distinguished between subjects at 
levels two and three of the justice-based moral perspective 
primarily on the basis of personality type, to a lesser 
degree on the basis of sex role orientation, and to a much 
lesser degree on the basis of locus of control orientation. 
Hypothesis IV. Hypothesis IV predicted that persons 
classified at the third level of the justice-based moral 
ethic (Postconventional) would have Empathist and Analyst 
personalities, with internal locus of control orientations, 
and with masculine and androgynous sex role'orientations. 
The function offered partial confirmation of this hypothesis. 
According to the function, based primarily upon personality 
type, young adults classified at level three (those concerned 
with universal principles) rather than at level two (those 
concerned with following social rules) were Empathists 
(warm, having values based upon responsibility in 
relationships) as opposed to being Legalists (conservative, 
conceptually restricted, and rule-followers). In addition, 
subjects classified at level three rather than at level two 
tended to identify with masculine as opposed to feminine 
characteristics. These findings were consistent with the 
expectations posited in Hypothesis IV. 
This function failed to support expectations posited in 
Hypothesis IV that Analyst personality types or those with 
androgynous sex role orientations would be classified as 
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reasoning at the third level of the justice-based moral 
perspective. Neither the Analyst versus Legalist variable 
nor the androgynous versus feminine variable were significant 
discriminators. The function also indicated, contrary to 
expectations, that individuals at level three as opposed to 
level two had external rather than internal locus of contol 
orientations. 
In summary, the third discriminant analysis offered 
partial support for the expectations of Hypothesis IV. The 
data showed that young adults at level three of the justice-
based moral perspective were distinguishable primarily by 
personality type and to a lesser extent by sex role 
orientation. When classified by personality, individuals at 
level three were likely to be Empathists, rather than 
Legalists, and to identify with masculine, rather than 
feminine, sex role orientations. On the other hand, results 
indicated that persons at level three were likely to be 
externally rather than internally controlling. 
No support was found for the expectations that young 
adults reasoning at level three of the justice perspective 
would have Analyst personalities or identify with androgynous 
sex role orientations. 
Hypothesis V 
Hypothesis V failed to be supported by a fourth stepwise 
discriminant analysis. Table 12 indicates that the overall F 
for the model was significant, ! (3, 126) = 7.82, ~ < .001. 
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Group classification results of the discriminant 
analysis testing Hypotheses V are presented in Table 13. 
Approximately 71 percent of all grouped cases were correctly 
classified by the discriminant model. Seventy-four percent 
of the subjects in the group reasoning at level two 
(Conventional) of the justice-based moral perspective were 
correctly predicted. Sixty-two percent of those reasoning at 
the third level (Postconventional) were correctly predicted. 
Thus membership at the second moral reasoning level could be 
better predicted than membership at the third level. 
Table 12 
Standardized Discriminant Coefficients Distinguishing Levels 
of Justice-based Moral Perspective by Personality Type, 
Sex Role Orientation, and Locus of Control Orientation 
Function 
Explained Variance 
% 
Discriminant Function 
Personality Type 
Realist/Empathist 
Sex Role Orientation 
Masculine/Undifferentiated 
Locus of Control Orientation 
External/Internal 
F 3, 126) = 7.82, E < .001. 
100.00 
Discriminant 
Coefficients 
.81 
-.43 
.35 
Table 13 
Group Classification Results: 
Discriminant Analysis Testing Hypothesis V; 
Levels of Justice-based Moral Perspective 
Levels of Predicted 
0'-
Justice No. of Level 2 
Perspective Cases !! % 
Level 2 96 71 74.0 
Level 3 34 13 38.2 
Groups 
Level 
!! 
25 
21 
Percent of all grouped cases correctly classified 
~ 
3 
% 
26.0 
61.8 
= 70.8% 
Number of subjects, out of the original 134, on whom there 
were complete data. 
80 
A summary of the canonical discriminant function 
evaluated at the group means (group centroids) is presented 
in Table 14. 
Table 14 
canonical Discriminant Function Evaluated at Group Means or 
Centroids: Discriminant Analysis Testing Hypothesis V 
Levels of Justice-based 
Moral Perspective 
Conventional - Level 2 
Postconventional - Level 3 
Discriminant 
Function 
.25 
-.72 
81 
Function. Only one function was identified by the 
fourth multiple discriminant analysis (Table 12). It 
therefore explained 100 percent of the explained variance in 
the model. It distinguished subjects at level two from those 
at level three of the justice-based moral perspective. None 
of the subjects were classified as reasoning at level one of 
this moral perspective (Table 14). 
The function variables (Table 12) in order of their 
discriminating abilities were the Realist versus Empathist 
personality type (.81), masculine versus undifferentiated sex 
role orientation (-.43), and locus of control orientation 
(.35). This function distinguished between subjects at 
levels two and three of the justice-based moral perspective 
primarily on the basis of personality type, and to a much 
lesser degree on the basis of sex role orientation and locus 
of control orientation. 
Hypothesis v. Hypothesis V predicted that young adults 
classified at the second level of the justice-based moral 
perspective (Conventional) would have Legalist and Realist 
personalities, with an external locus of control orientation, 
and with masculine, feminine, and androgynous sex role 
orientations. The discriminant function failed to support 
this hypothesis. According to the function, based primarily 
upon personality type, individuals who reasoned at the 
second, Conventional level (based on social rules) rather 
than at the third, Postconventional level (based on universal 
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principles) of the justice-based moral perspective were 
Empathists (warm, and interested values based upon 
responsibility in relationships) as opposed to being Realists 
(observant, non-judgmental, physical, and spontaneous. In 
addition, individuals at level two as opposed to those at 
level three tended to identify with undifferentiated sex role 
orientations (having neither many masculine nor feminine 
characteristics) rather than having masculine sex role 
orientations. Persons at level two versus level three also 
were internally versus externally controlling. These 
findings contradicted the expectations posed by Hypothesis v. 
This function failed to support expectations posited in 
Hypothesis v that Legalist personality types or those with 
feminine or androgynous sex role orientations would be 
classified as reasoning at the second level of the justice-
based moral perspective. Neither the Legalist versus 
Empathist variable, the feminine versus undifferentiated 
variable, nor the androgynous versus undifferentiated 
variable were significant discriminators. 
In summary, the fourth discriminant analysis failed to 
provide support for the expectations of Hypothesis v. The 
data showed that young adults at level two of the justice-
based moral perspective were distinguishable primarily by 
personality type. Under this distinction they were likely to 
be Empathists rather than Legalists, to identify with an 
undifferentiated rather than masculine sex role orientation, 
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and to be internally rather than externally controlling. 
No support was found for the expectations that young 
adults reasoning at level two of the justice perspective 
would have Realist personalities or identify with feminine or 
androgynous sex role orientations. 
Hypothesis VI 
Hypothesis VI failed to be supported by a fifth stepwise 
discriminant analysis. The overall ~ for the fifth multiple 
discriminant analysis was significant, ~ (4, 125) = 5.88, 
E < .001 (Table 15). 
Group classification results of the discriminant 
analysis testing Hypotheses VI are presented in Table 16. 
Approximately 69 percent of all grouped cases were correctly 
classified by the discriminant model. Seventy percent of the 
subjects in the group reasoning at level two (Conventional) 
of the justice-based moral perspective were correctly 
predicted. Sixty-eight percent of those reasoning at the 
third level (Postconventional) were correctly predicted. 
Thus membership at the second moral reasoning level could be 
slightly better predicted than membership at the third level. 
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Table 15 
Standardized Discriminant Coefficients Distinguishing Levels 
of Justice-based Moral Perspective by Personality Type, 
Sex Role Orientation, and Locus of Control Orientation 
Function 
Explained Variance 
% 
Discriminant Function 100.00 
Personality Type 
Realist/Empathist 
Sex Role Orientation 
Masculine/Feminine 
Undifferentiated/Feminine 
Locus of Control Orientation 
External/Internal 
Total 100.00 
r < 4, 12s> = s.88, E < .oo1. 
Discriminant 
Coefficients 
.81 
-.70 
.59 
.35 
Table 16 
Group Classification Results: 
Discriminant Analysis Testing Hypothesis VI; 
Levels of Justice-based Moral Perspective 
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Levels of Predicted Groups 
Justice 
Perspective 
Level 2 
Level 3 
v-
No. of 
Cases 
96 
34 
Level 2 
n 
67 
11 
% 
69.8 
32.4 
Level 3 
n 
29 
23 
% 
30.2 
67.6 
Percent of all grouped cases correctly classified = 69.2% 
0... 
Number of subjects, out of the original 134, on whom there 
were complete data. 
Table 17 presents a summary of the discriminant function 
evaluated at the group means (group centroids). 
Table 17 
canonical Discriminant Function Evaluated at Group Means or 
Centroids: Discriminant Analysis Testing Hypothesis VI 
Levels of Justice-based 
Moral Perspective 
Conventional - Level 2 
Postconventional - Level 3 
Discriminant 
Function 
.26 
-.72 
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Function. Only one function was identified by the fifth 
multiple discriminant analysis (Table 15). It therefore 
explained 100 percent of the explained variance in the model. 
It distinguished subjects at level two from those at level 
three of the justice-based moral perspective. None of the 
subjects were classified as reasoning at level one of this 
moral perspective (Table 17). 
The function variables (Table 15) in order of their 
discriminating abilities were the Realist versus Empathist 
personality type (.81), masculine versus feminine sex role 
orientation (-.70), undifferentiated versus feminine sex role 
orientation (.59), and locus of control orientation (.35). 
This function distinguished between subjects at levels two 
and three of the justice-based moral perspective primarily on 
the basis of personality type, to a lesser degree on the 
basis of sex role orientation, and to a much lesser degree on 
the basis of locus of control orientation. 
Hypothesis VI. Hypothesis VI predicted that young 
adults classified at the lowest level of the justice-based 
moral perspective (Preconventional) would have Legalist and 
Realist personalities, with an internal locus of control 
orientation, and with masculine sex role orientations. Only 
one function was identified by this analysis. It indicated 
that all grouped subjects fell into either level two 
(Conventional) or level three (Postconventional) of the 
justice-based moral perspective. Therefore this analysis 
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only differentiated between subjects at level two and level 
three of the justice-based moral perspective (Table 16). 
Thus, this analysis failed to support any of the expectations 
posited in Hypothesis VI since it was entirely predictive of 
grouping into level one. 
In summary, the fifth discriminant analysis failed to 
provide support for the expectations of Hypothesis VI. The 
data showed that the young adults in the study were 
classified either into level two or level three of the 
justice-based moral perspective. This analysis could not 
address any of the expectations posited in Hypothesis VI 
since it made predictions regarding only level one. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The first part of this chapter includes a summary of 
this investigation. The summation is followed by a 
discussion of the findings. The discussion includes a 
description of young adults who reason morally at the 
different levels of each of the two moral perspectives, care 
and justice. It also describes how the findings of this 
study provide support for the moral perspective construct. 
This discussion is followed by the major conclusions from 
this research and the proposed direction for future 
investigations of moral perspective-taking. 
Summary 
Carol Gilligan, in 1982, suggested that males and 
females take separate and distinct approaches when making a 
moral decision. Other investigations (Walker, 1984; Gibbs et 
al., 1984) have failed to support the relationship between 
gender and moral perspective. These findings have called 
into question the validity of the moral perspective-taking 
construct. Together, this contradictory research provided 
the impetus for further examination of the moral perspective 
variable. 
Research has demonstrated a relationship between moral 
perspective and personality type (Tappan, 1985), locus of 
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control orientation (Gutkin & Suls, 1979), and sex role 
orientation (Lanky et al., 1988). In addition, a review of 
the literature (Walker, 1984) shows that differences in moral 
perspective-taking are most often found among the young adult 
population. This developmental period is conceived as a 
transition from the egocentrism of childhood and adolescence 
to the moral maturity more often found in middle and late 
adulthood (Kohlberg, 1981). 
The present study investigated the relationship between 
three independent variables (personality type, locus of 
control orientation, and sex role orientation) and moral 
perspective in young adults. Subjects were 134 18 to 25 
years old, male and female, caucasian, technical community 
college students who were enrolled in a college transfer 
curriculum. They were administered five paper-and-pencil 
instruments: the Myers-Briggs Personality Type Indicator (to 
index personality type); Rotter's Internal/External Scale (to 
index locus of control orientation; the Bern Sex Role 
Inventory (to index sex role orientation); the Relationship 
Self Inventory (to index the care-based moral perspective); 
and the Defining Issues Test (to index the justice-based 
moral perspective). 
Six hypotheses were formulated based upon social 
learning theory, Kohlberg's (1981) theory of moral 
development, Gilligan's (1982) theory of moral perspectives, 
and moral reasoning research literature. Each hypothesis 
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predicted that a particular combination of personalities, sex 
role orientations, and locus of control orientation would be 
associated with a specific level of a particular moral 
perspective. Within the care ethic, individuals at the 
third, and highest level were predicted to be feminine, 
internally controlling, and to value responsibility in 
relationships. Those at level two were expected to be 
similar in personality and sex role to those at level three 
but posited to be externally controlled. Persons at the 
first level of care were predicted to be masculine, 
internally controlling, and rule-followers. Within the 
justice ethic, individuals at the third, and highest level 
were expected to be masculine, internally controlling, and to 
value responsibility in relationships. Those at level two 
were predicted to be externally controlled, masculine and 
feminine rule-followers. Persons at level one were posited 
to be masculine, internally controlled rule-followers. 
Separate multiple stepwise discriminant analyses were 
performed to test each of the hypotheses. The analyses 
provided partial support for three of the six hypotheses. 
Within the care ethic, individuals at the third, and highest 
level were found to be androgynous, externally controlled, 
and to value responsibility in relationships. Those at level 
two were found to be masculine, internally controlling 
rule-folowers. Care level one persons were found to be 
feminine, internally controlling, and to value responsibility 
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in relationships. 
Within the justice ethic, individuals at the third, and 
highest level were found to be masculine, externally 
controlled, and to value responsibility in relationships. 
Those at level two were found to be internally controlling 
rule-followers with undifferentiated sex role orientations. 
None of the subjects were classified into level one of the 
justice perspective. 
This study tested a relatively unexamined instrument, 
the Relationship Self Inventory (Reinhart et al., 1985), 
which was designed to measure the care-based moral 
perspective. The results of this study showed personality 
type, locus of control orientation, and sex role orientation 
to be predictive of moral perspective. Altogether, results 
from this investigation contribute to a more complete and, 
therefore, valid conception of the moral perspective. 
Discussion 
This study provides support for the importance of 
psycho-social attributes to moral perspective-taking in young 
adults. It shows that young adults can be grouped with 
respect to moral perspective primarily by personality type or 
locus of control orientation, and to a lesser extent by sex 
role orientation. 
Levels of Moral Perspectives 
This investigation shows that young adults can be 
grouped according to either of two moral perspectives, one 
based upon responsibility in relationships and the other 
grounded upon rights based upon laws and principles. 
The Care-based Moral Perspective 
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Young adults can be characterized at each care ethic 
level, i.e., "Primacy of Both Self and Other Care", "Primacy 
of Other Care", and "Primacy of Self Care" in terms of: 
1) their personalities; 2) their beliefs about who or what 
controls life's events; and 3) their identification with a 
gender role. Personality is more than twice as likely as 
locus of control or sex role to distinguish among young 
adults who reason morally based upon an awareness of 
responsibility to self and others. 
"Primacy of Both Self and Other care" - Level Three. 
When classified by personality, young adults who care equally 
for self and others (care level three) are most likely to be 
androgynous, externally controlled, and to value 
responsibility in relationships. The current study's 
expectations that they have Empathist personalities and 
androgynous sex role characteristics are supported. However, 
its prediction that they believe they control their life's 
events is not. 
When these individuals are grouped by locus of control 
orientation, they are most likely to be masculine, internally 
controlling rule-followers. This study's posit that they 
believe they control their consequences is borne out. 
However, its predictions pertaining to personality and sex 
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role are not supported. 
"Primacy of Other Care" - Level Two. When grouped by 
personality, young adults who are primarily concerned for 
others (care level two) are most likely to be masculine, 
internally controlling rule-followers. This study's 
predictions that they have Empathist personalities and 
androgynous gender roles, and believe that they are 
controlled by fate are not supported. When classified by 
locus of control orientation, these persons are not 
sufficiently distinguished from those who are primarily 
concerned about their own welfare or those who are equally 
concerned for their own and others' needs to allow 
characterization regarding their personalities, gender roles, 
or beliefs about internal versus external controlling forces. 
"Primacy of Self Care" - Level One. When individuals 
are grouped by personality type, those who are primarily 
concerned for their own needs (care level one) are most 
likely to be feminine, internally controlling, and to value 
responsibility in relationships. The current investigation's 
prediction that they believe they control their lives is 
borne out. However, its posit that they have Legalist 
personalities and masculine gender roles is not upheld. The 
observed characteristics of these individuals are similar 
whether they are classified by personality or by locus of 
control orientation. 
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Support for the Care Moral Perspective Construct 
This study shows that, when young adults are classified 
according to the care ethic by personality, the relationships 
between their personalities, gender roles, and locus of 
control orientations are generally consistent with Gilligan's 
(1982) theory of moral perspective-taking. This theory 
suggests that individuals who use the care perspective are 
most likely to value responsibility in relationships 
(Empathists), to identify with feminine qualities (which 
includes androgyny), and to be internally controlling. 
Consistent with that theory is the observation that 
individuals at the lowest ("Primacy of Celf Care) and highest 
("Primacy of Both Self and Other Care) levels of the care 
approach value responsibility in relationships rather than 
being rule-followers. However, those at level two ("Primacy 
of Other Care") are legalistic rule-followers as opposed to 
being guided by responsibility in relationships. The latter 
characterization, inconsistent with Gilligan's theory, 
appears to be related to sex role orientation. In the 
current study, whether classified by personality type or 
locus of control orientation, when young adults are 
identified as Legalists they are also observed to identify 
with masculine sex roles. In each instance where they were 
identified as Empathists, they were seen to have feminine or 
androgynous gender role orientations. 
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The observation that Empathists, as opposed to 
Legalists, reason at the highest care level supports previous 
findings that occupational personality types (health service 
workers, religious workers) show stronger development in the 
domain of ethical evaluation than do others (electrical 
technicians, clerical machine operators) (Tappan, 1985). 
In the same vein, Lifton (1982) reported that individuals who 
reason morally in similar ways also have similar 
personalities. The present study shows that Legalists, 
rather than Empathists, reason morally at the middle care 
level while Empathists, rather than Legalists, reason morally 
at the lowest level. 
Also consistent with Gilligan's theory is the 
observation that, when they are grouped by personality, young 
adults who mainly care for their own needs and those who 
primarily care for others needs are internally controlling. 
However, those who care for the needs of both are externally 
controlled. This latter characterization, inconsistent with 
Gilligan's theory, appears to be related to the level of 
moral reasoning used. In this study, only young adults who 
reasoned at the highest levels of each moral approach are 
characterized as externally controlled. Those reasoning at 
the lower two levels of both perspectives are identified as 
internally controlling. Thus the level of moral reasoning 
attained appears to be associated with beliefs about who or 
what controls life's events. 
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The observation that young adults who tend to both their 
own and the needs of others also believe that fate controls 
the events in their lives fails to support previous findings 
that subjects who showed greater tendencies toward social 
responsibility also tended to show more internal locus of 
control (Gutkin and Suls, 1979). These characterizations of 
the current study may have been produced by some intervening 
variable, such as affective distance (how closely involved an 
individual is to the consequences of his/her moral decision), 
which was not investigated. Numerous studies have indicated 
that locus of control orientation is indirectly associated 
with moral perspective through a third factor, affective 
involvement (Lonky et al., 1988; Gilligan, 1982; Rybash et 
al., 1981; Lickona, 1978; Kohlberg et al., 1972). 
Likewise supportive of Gilligan's theory is the 
observation that young adults at the lowest care level 
have feminine sex roles and those at the highest care level 
have androgynous ones. However, contrary to her theory, 
persons at level two have masculine, rather than androgynous, 
sex roles. The latter appears to be related to personality 
type. At each level of the care perspective, whether 
classified by personality type or locus of control 
orientation, where young adults are identified as Legalists, 
they were also characterized as identifying with masculine 
gender roles. In each instance where they were identified as 
Empathists, they were characterized as having feminine or 
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androgynous sex role orientations. 
The observation that feminine (as opposed to masculine) 
sex roles are associated with the lowest care level, and that 
androgynous (as opposed to masculine) sex roles are 
associated with the highest care level is consistent with 
previous research (Gilligan, 1982; Ford & Lowery, 1986; 
Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; and Lonkey et al., 1988) which 
reports that feminine qualities generally correspond to the 
care ethic. In addition, observing that androgyny, but not 
strictly feminine, characteristics are associated with the 
highest care level is consistent with the contradictory 
results of previous research reported by Walker (1984). 
Inconsistencies in the Literature. This study predicted 
that young adults who are concerned for the welfare of others 
above their own (level two - "Primacy of Other Care") would 
be externally controlled. However, Gilligan's (1982) theory 
and the research literature suggest that an internal locus of 
control orientation corresponds in general to the care 
ethic's focus on individual responsibility in dealing with 
others. Her suggestion appears to contradict social learning 
theory's notion that individuals tend to maximize their own 
benefits in the absence of social consequences to modify 
inherent self-interest (Bandura, 1977; 1973). Therefore, it 
was deduced that individuals who would subjugate an inherent 
concern regarding their own welfare to a concern for that of 
others would do so on the basis of perceiving that external 
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society-based rules dictate such behavior. 
In the present investigation, young adults who are 
concerned primarily for the welfare of others believe they 
should make their own independent decisions. This 
observation fails to support this study's expectation, but is 
consistent with Gilligan's (1982) theory. It is also 
consistent with the research literature which indicates that 
subjects who show greater tendencies toward social 
responsibility also tend to show more internal locus of 
control (Gutkin & Suls, 1979). Young adults who are 
concerned more about the needs of others than their own do 
not perceive that external society-based rules are dictating 
their behavior. 
The finding that those who are primarily concerned with 
the care of others (level two), based primarily on 
personality, are masculine in orientation, as opposed to 
feminine, and rule-followers, as opposed to being guided by 
values based upon responsibility in relationships, does not 
support Gilligan's suggestions. However, the fact that such 
individuals believe they make their own moral decisions 
supports her theory. 
The characterization of young adults who subjugate their 
own needs to those of others as masculine oriented legalistic 
rule-followers appears to be related to their beliefs about 
locus of control. It is reasoned that an apparent 
contradiction exists in social learning theory suggestions 
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that, while an internal locus of control orientation is 
believed to correspond to the care ethic's focus upon 
individual responsibility in dealing with others, it is also 
believed that this perspective develops through social 
conditioning. Thus, according to social learning principles, 
attitudes regarding "individual responsibility in dealing 
with others" are initially externally dictated, but come to 
be controlled by internal processes. Therefore, legalistic, 
rule-following young adults, who are nevertheless internally 
controlling, may be internally controlling in general. 
However, they may not have had internalized social 
expectations to the point of possessing personal values based 
upon responsibility in relationships. 
This study also predicted that young adults who are 
more concerned about their own needs than the needs of others 
(level one - "Primacy of Self Care") would be conceptually 
restricted and rule-following (Legalists) rather than be 
influenced by values based upon responsibility in 
relationships (Empathists). This posit was made despite 
theoretical (Gilligan, 1982) and research (Tappan, 1985) 
suggestions which would link Empathist personalities to the 
care perspective in general. 
It was reasoned that level one of the care ethic exists 
as an apparent hybrid. on the one hand, "Primacy of Self 
Care" can be viewed as one extreme of a dimension of "self 
and other care", opposite the other extreme, "Primacy of Both 
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Self and Other Care" (Gilligan, 1988). On the other hand, 
level one of the care perspective can be viewed from the 
perspective of "man-as-an-island", i.e., as 
"self-not-in-relation-to-others", or "self-care-from-need" 
(Reinhart et al., 1985). Therefore, it was deduced that 
individuals whose personalities which stress values based 
upon responsibility in relationships (Empathists) would not 
be more concerned about their own needs than the needs of 
others. It was more likely that personalities concerned 
about their rights relative to the rights of others 
(Legalists) would prove to be primarily concerned with their 
own needs as well. 
In the current study, young adults who are concerned 
primarily for their own welfare are characterized by 
personalities which stress values based upon responsibility 
in relationships. This observation fails to support this 
investigation's prediction, but is consistent with Gilligan's 
theory. Young adults at even the lowest care level do not 
have rule-following personalities. 
This investigation also posited that young adults who 
mainly care for their own needs would identify with masculine 
psycho-social sex roles. This expectation was made 
on the basis of an apparent contradiction in Gilligan's 
(1982) theory of moral perspective-taking. On the one hand, 
females are thought to make greater use of the care 
perspective in general, including the lowest level. However, 
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the theory also suggests that concern for one's own rights, 
as opposed to others' rights, is a legalistic, male trait. 
Therefore, despite Gilligan's suggestion that feminine sex 
role orientations are associated with the care ethic in 
general (including level one), it was anticipated that 
masculine sex role orientations would be associated with this 
level due to its legalistic nature. 
In this study, young adults who are concerned primarily 
for their own welfare identify with feminine qualities. This 
observation fails to support the prediction of this 
investigation, but is consistent with Gilligan's theory. 
Young adults who are concerned more about their own needs 
than those of others do not have masculine traits. 
The inconsistent findings of previous studies which 
examined the relationship between gender (in which gender was 
indexed biologically) and moral perspective (Vasudev, 1988; 
Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; Walker, 1984; Gibbs et al., 1984) 
prompted the suggestion that gender be indexed by 
psycho-social sex role orientation (Lonkey et al., 1988; Ford 
& Lowery, 1986). When so done Lonkey et al. (1988) and Ford 
and Lowery (1986) reported a greater use of the care 
perspective among males with feminine sex role orientations. 
They present their results as support for the notion that 
feminine sex role orientations are associated with use of the 
care perspective. The finding of the current study that 
only individuals who identified with both feminine and 
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masculine qualities reason at the highest level of the care 
perspective indicates that their findings are possibly the 
result of having used male subjects. 
The current findings re-emphasize the fact that the 
relationship between sex role orientation and the care-based 
moral perspective is not a simple one. Results from this 
study and those from previous investigations (Lonkey et al., 
1988; Ford & Lowery, 1986) indicate that a combination of 
feminine and masculine qualities characterize individuals who 
utilize the care-based perspective in making moral decisions. 
Prior findings may be due to the influence of locus of 
control orientation. Such reasoning is based upon the 
apparent contradiction in social learning theory suggestions. 
On the one hand, an internal locus of control orientation is 
thought to be connected to the care moral perspective. On the 
other hand, individuals who would subjugate an inherent 
concern regarding their own welfare to a concern for the 
welfare of others are thought to perceive that external 
society-based rules dictate such behavior. Therefore, the 
major distinction between the two moral perspectives may not 
be based primarily upon sex role orientation, as suggested by 
Gilligan. It may be more fundamentally a matter of locus of 
control orientation. 
The Justice-based Moral Perspective 
Young adults can be characterized at both the highest 
(Postconventional) and middle (Conventional) justice ethic 
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levels in terms of: 1) their personalities; 2) their beliefs 
about who or what controls life.'s events; and, 3) their 
identification with a gender role. None of the subjects were 
classified at the lowest (Preconventional) level. Young 
adults can be classified according to the justice-based moral 
perspective only on the basis of personality type. 
Postconventional - Level Three. Young adults who are 
guided in making moral decisions by internalized principles 
which preclude purposeful harm to self and others (justice 
level three) are most likely to be masculine, externally 
controlled, and to value responsibility in relationships. 
The current study's predictions that they have Empathist 
personalities and masculine gender roles are borne out. 
However, its expectation that they believe they control their 
lives is not. 
Conventional - Level Two. Young adults who are guided 
in making moral decisions by social rules and conventions 
(justice level two) are most likely to have undifferentiated 
sex roles, to be internally controlling, and to value 
responsibility in relationships. This study's expectations 
that they have Legalist personalities and masculine gender 
roles, and believe that others have control their fate are 
not supported. 
Preconventional - Level One. None of the subjects were 
classified as reasoning on the basis of the anticipated 
consequences of the decision (justice level one). This 
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outcome was not entirely unexpected. Individuals usually 
progress beyond level one of the justice-based moral 
perspective by 7 to 8 years of age (Wise, 1986). Therefore, 
the multiple stepwise discriminant analysis did not 
characterize level one regarding personality type, locus of 
control orientation, or sex role orientation. 
Support for the Justice Moral Perspective Construct 
This study shows that, when young adults are classified 
according to the justice ethic by personality, the 
relationships between their personalities, gender roles, and 
locus of control orientations are generally inconsistent with 
Gilligan's (1982) theory of moral perspective-taking. This 
theory suggests that individuals who use the justice 
perspective are most likely to be rule-followers (Legalists), 
to identify with masculine qualities, and to be externally 
controlled. 
Inconsistent with that theory is the observation that 
individuals at the middle (Conventional) and highest 
(Postconventional) levels of the justice approach are 
influenced by values based upon responsibility in 
relationships (Empathists) rather than by a tendency to be 
rule-followers (Legalists). This characterization suggests 
that Kohlberg's and Gilligan's interpretation that persons 
reasoning morally according to the justice ethic base their 
judgments on external rules and internal principles may be 
flawed. Instead, they are based on an internal feeling of 
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connectedness to others and the internal awareness of 
responsibility which grows out of relationships. Thus, young 
adults who appear to be guided by social rules or by 
internalized principles are influenced by values based upon 
responsibility in relationships rather than by a tendency to 
follow rules. 
This characterization appears to be related to how moral 
decision making is operationally defined. Gilligan suggests 
that moral reasoning is based upon an internal feeling of 
responsibility in relationships. on the other hand, Kohlberg 
suggests that it is based upon an awareness of external rules 
which may become internalized principles. Thus, locus of 
control is a salient component in conceptualizing moral 
reasoning. 
The observation that young adults who are morally guided 
by internalized principles are Empathists is consistent with 
some, and inconsistent with other, previous research findings 
that occupational personality types (health service workers, 
religious workers) show stronger development in the domain of 
justice judgment than do others (electrical technicians, 
clerical machine operators~ (Tappan, 1985). However, Lifton 
(1982) reported that individuals who reason morally in 
similar ways also have similar personalities. The 
observation that Empathists reason morally at both justice 
levels two and three contradict Lifton's observations. This 
~esult appears to be related to caring for others which is 
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the element common to both these levels. 
Consistent with Gilligan's theory is the observation 
that persons at the highest justice level are externally 
controlled. This characterization points to one of the major 
distinctions between Gilligan's and Kohlberg's 
conceptualizations about moral reasoning. In contrast to 
Gilligan, Kohlberg suggests that individuals at this level of 
moral reasoning are guided by internalized principles. 
Observations of the highest level of justice reasoning 
supports Gilligan's views. 
Inconsistent with both Gilligan's and Kohlberg's 
theories is the observation that individuals at the middle 
justice level are internally controlling. Young adults who 
are supposedly guided by external rules (middle justice 
level) are, paradoxically, internally controlling. This 
observation appears to be related to sex role orientation. 
In the present study, the Empathist personality characterizes 
young adults at both the middle and the highest justice 
levels. However, young adults are internally controlling at 
the middle level, but externally controlled at the highest. 
Similarly, they have undifferentiated sex role orientations 
at the middle justice level, but have masculine sex roles at 
the highest one. 
The observation that individuals who are guided by 
internal principles believe that others control their life 
events is consistent with some, and inconsistent with other, 
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research findings. The external locus of control is linked 
to the justice ethic in general (Gilligan, 1982; Gilligan & 
Attanucci, 1988). However, Gutkin and Suls (1979) reported 
that subjects who show greater tendencies toward social 
responsibility also tend to show more internal locus of 
control. As is the case of individuals at the highest care 
level, persons at the third justice level are externally 
controlled while those at the second level are internally 
controlling. This observation, likewise may have been 
produced by some intervening variable, such as affective 
distance (the degree to which a person's moral decisions 
affect him/her), which was not investigated. 
Also supportive of Gilligan's theory is the observation 
that young adults at the third justice level have masculine, 
as opposed to feminine, sex roles. However, contrary to her 
theory, persons at level two have undifferentiated, rather 
than masculine sex roles. This observation appears to be 
related to locus of control orientation. In the present 
study, the Empathist personality characterizes young adults 
at both the middle and the highest justice levels. However, 
young adults have undifferentiated sex role orientations at 
the middle level, but have masculine sex roles at the 
highest. Similarly, they are internally controlling at the 
middle justice level, but externally controlled at the 
highest one. 
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Observing that young adults who are guided by 
internalized principles have masculine (as opposed to 
feminine) sex roles is consistent with previous research 
(Gilligan, 1982; Ford & Lowery, 1986; Gilligan & Attanucci, 
1988; and Lonkey et al., 1988) which connects this gender 
role with the justice ethic in general. In addition, 
observing that undifferentiated orientations, rather than 
masculine, characterize persons who are guided by external 
rules and conventions is consistent with the contradictory 
results of previous research reported by Walker (1984). 
Inconsistencies in the Literature. This study predicted 
that young adults who made moral decisions on the basis of an 
internalized set of ethical principles (level three -
Postconventional) would be warm and possess values based upon 
responsibility in relationships (Empathists) rather than 
conceptually restricted, and rule-following (Legalists). 
This posit was made despite theoretical (Gilligan, 1982) and 
research (Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988) suggestions which would 
link Legalist personalities to the justice perspective 
generally. Level three of the justice perspective exists as 
an apparent hybrid of justice and care ethics. Kohlberg 
(1981) suggested that individuals at this level have an 
internalized set of ethical principles which preclude 
purposeful harm to self and others. These principles may at 
times supercede rules of civil authority which are 
inconsistent with the individual's ethical value system. 
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Therefore, it was deduced that individuals who are 
conceptually restricted rule-followers (Legalists) would not 
have an internalized set of ethical principles which would: 
1) preclude purposeful harm to self and others; and 2) at 
times supercede rules of civil authority if they were 
inconsistent with their ethical value systems. 
Observing that young adults who are guided by internal 
principles are Empathist (as opposed to Legalist) supports 
this study's expectation. Therefore, this finding is not 
consistent with the conceptualizations posed by Gilligan's 
theory that individuals who use the justice ethic are 
legalistic thinkers. Young adults who are guided by 
internalized principles do not have rule-following 
personalities. 
This investigation also predicted that young adults who 
are guided by internalized principles would be internally 
controlling. This expectation was made on the basis of the 
hybrid nature of the conceptualization of the third level. 
Kohlberg's (1981) characterization of level three justice-
based moral reasoning {precluding purposeful harm to self and 
others) closely resembles Gilligan's (1982) depiction of 
level three care-based moral reasoning (equal concern for the 
welfare of both self and others). Social learning theory 
suggests that an internal locus of control orientation 
corresponds to the care perspective's focus upon individual 
responsibility in dealing with others. Therefore, it was 
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reasoned that individuals who show concern for the well-being 
of both self and others (level three of both moral 
perspectives) would be internally controlling as opposed to 
externally controlled by rules. However, young adults guided 
by internal principles believe that their lives are in the 
hands of the external world. While not supportive of this 
study's prediction, this observation is consistent with the 
conceptualizations posed by Gilligan's theory. However, it 
is inconsistent with the research literature which indicates 
that subjects who show greater tendencies toward social 
responsibility also show more internal locus of control 
(Gutkin & Suls, 1979). Young adults who are guided by 
internalized principles, paradoxically, have an understanding 
that external society-based rules dictate such behavior. 
This study also predicted that young adults who are 
guided by rules and conventions would believe that 
surrounding social institutions controlled them. Social 
learning theory and previous research (Gilligan, 1982; 
Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988) suggest that an external locus 
of control orientation corresponds, in general, to the 
justice ethic's emphasis upon external society-based rules. 
However, these young adults believe they control their fates. 
The expectation of this study is not supported, and 
characterizations of persons at level two are not consistent 
with the conceptualizations posed by theory or research. 
Young adults who make moral decisions on the basis of social 
rules and conventions, paradoxically, do not perceive that 
external, society-based rules dictate such behavior. 
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The present investigation posited that young adults who 
make moral decisions on the basis of social rules and 
conventions (level two) would identify with stereotypically 
masculine characteristics. Observing that undifferentiated 
sex role orientations are associated with the second level of 
the justice perspective failed to support this expectation. 
This observation is neither consistent with the 
propositions put forth by social learning theory and 
Gilligan's theory of moral perspective-taking, nor is it 
consistent with the research literature (Gilligan, 1982; Ford 
& Lowery, 1986; Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; and Lonkey et 
al., 1988) which connects this gender role with the justice 
ethic in general. This result appears to be related to locus 
of control orientation. In the present study, the Empathist 
personality characterizes young adults at both the middle and 
the highest justice levels. However, young adults have 
undifferentiated sex role orientations at the middle level, 
but have masculine sex roles at the highest. Similarly, they 
are internally controlling at the middle justice level, but 
externally controlled at the highest one. Therefore, again, 
the major distinction between the two moral perspectives may 
not be based upon sex role orientation, as suggested by 
Gilligan. It may be more fundamentally a matter of locus of 
control orientation. 
The current findings re-emphasize the fact that the 
relationship between sex role orientation and the justice-
based moral perspective is not a simple one. Results from 
this research and those from previous investigations 
(Vasudev, 1988; Gibbs et al., 1984: Walker, 1984) indicate 
that the gender role identification associated with the 
justice perspective is unclear. 
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These findings may be due to the influence of locus of 
control orientation. Such reasoning is based upon the 
apparent contradiction in social learning theory suggestions. 
On the one hand, an internal locus of control orientation is 
thought to be connected to an awareness of responsibility in 
relationships. On the other hand, individuals who are guided 
by universal principles are thought to have internalized and 
extrapolated them from external society-based rules. 
Therefore, the major distinction between the two moral 
perspectives may be more fundamentally a matter of locus of 
control orientation rather than sex role orientation per se. 
Conclusions 
Five major conclusions may be drawn from the findings of 
the present investigation: 1) Levels within two moral 
perspectives can be predicted by personality type, locus of 
control orientation, and sex role orientation; 2) The basis 
for grouping individuals according to moral perspective (by 
personality or locus of control) influences how they are 
characterized; 3) Care and justice ethical perspectives, are 
more likely to be related to locus of control orientation 
than sex role orientation; 4) Similarities between the 
perspectives obscure the distinctions between them; and, 
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5) Some differences between the moral approaches depend upon 
the ways in which moral reasoning is operationally defined 
and measured. 
Prediction of Moral Perspectives 
The present study indicates that individuals can be 
identified at each of the three levels of the care-based 
moral perspective and the two higher levels of the 
justice-based moral perspective according to their 
personality types, locus of control orientations, and sex 
role orientations. Distinctions at level one of the justice 
ethic are less clear because none of the young adults in this 
study were classified at this level. For example, 
individuals usually, but not necessarily, progress beyond 
level one of the justice-based moral perspective by 7 to 8 
years of age (Wise, 1986). 
The Basis for Classifying According to Moral Perspective 
The results of this study would predict that young 
adults could be classified at the different levels of the 
care-based moral perspective primarily on the basis of their 
personalities, and to a lesser extent, on locus of control 
orientation. However, individuals could be classified at the 
different levels of the justice-based moral perspective 
primarily on the basis of personality type only. 
The current study indicates that the basis for 
classifying young adults within moral perspectives (by 
personality type or by locus of control orientation) 
influences the specific combinations of personality types, 
locus of control orientations, and sex role orientations 
which characterize these individuals. The three 
psycho-social variables are associated with the care 
perspective, but have differential predictive powers. 
Therefore, the basis for grouping individuals must be 
considered when positing expectations regarding their 
personalities, locus of control orientations, or gender 
roles. 
Furthermore, results showed that neither of the 
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bases for classifying young adults within the care 
perspective yielded a constant characterization across all 
levels. Differing combinations of personality types, locus 
of control orientations, and sex role orientations 
characterize the three levels of the care ethic. Likewise, 
when classified according to the justice ethic by locus of 
control, young adults indicated that varying combinations of 
personalities, locus of control orientations, and 
psycho-social sex roles characterize the higher two levels of 
the justice ethic. 
Moral Perspectives and Locus of Control Orientation 
Gilligan (1982) suggested the existence of two separate 
and distinct approaches, or perspectives, to moral reasoning. 
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Furthermore, these two perspectives reside in each person but 
may not be equal in their influence on a person's thoughts 
and actions (Gilligan, 1988). One moral reasoning approach 
equates morality with justice, where a moral problem is 
constructed as an issue of rights and rules. The other 
approach identifies morality with care and constructs a moral 
problem as an issue of connectedness to others and 
responsibilities in relationships. The apparent distinction 
is between rights (based upon external rules) and 
responsibilities (based upon an internal recognition of 
connectedness to others). However, social rules designate 
not only one's rights but also responsibility to the needs of 
others. Traffic laws state that one has a right to pass 
through an intersection if s/he has a green light. However, 
they also state that the individual has a legal 
responsibility to stop at the intersection if s/he has a red 
light. Therefore, the critical distinction between these two 
approaches appears to rest upon the locus of control factor 
as opposed to simply rights versus responsibilities. 
Locus of control orientation as an integral factor in 
moral perspective-taking is further supported by findings 
pertaining to personality type. Personality type was the 
primary basis for classifying young adults within the levels 
of each of the care and justice ethics. When so classified, 
individuals at the second and highest levels of both 
perspectiv~s had Empathist personalities. However, young 
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adults at the second levels of both approaches were 
internally controlling, while those at both of the highest 
levels were externally controlled. Thus, moral reasoners at 
the highest levels of both perspectives were characterized by 
values based upon responsibility in relationships 
(Empathists), but influenced by external rules and 
conventions. Therefore, the highest levels of moral 
reasoning involve responsibility dictated, but not 
necessarily internalized, by external rules. 
The between-perspective differences are primarily 
related to sex role orientation. However, the between-level 
differences appear to be related to locus of control 
orientation. These observations suggest that identification 
with sex roles is associated with an identification with 
locus of control orientation. They indicate that internally 
controlling individuals reason at the second levels of both 
perspectives, while externally controlled persons reason at 
the highest levels of both approaches. This observation 
contradicts Kohlberg's model which suggests moral reasoning 
is first under the control of externally based rules which 
then come to be internalized by the individual. 
The observation that internally controlling persons 
reason at the middle levels of both approaches may be due to 
developmental characteristics of the subjects chosen for 
investigation. Young adults were selected in order to 
maximize the possibility of detecting sex role differences in 
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moral perspective-taking. However, thoughtfully deducing 
universal concern for the welfare of others is considered a 
behavior more closely associated with the middle and later 
years than with young adulthood. Young adults are thought to 
be influenced to reason morally by externally based rules. 
Individuals who indicated universal concern for others as 
well as for themselves may have been influenced to do so by 
an understanding that such a position is dictated by social 
convention. The fact that young adults reasoning at the 
second levels were internally controlling indicates that they 
may have already internalized society's rules by this point 
in their life-spans. 
While the between-perspective differences are primarily 
related to sex role orientation, the findings suggest that 
identification with sex roles is associated with an 
identification with locus of control orientations. Again, 
the critical distinction be~ween these two approaches appears 
to depend at least as much upon the locus of control factor. 
Indeed, the distinction between moral perspectives may 
be viewed as a matter of focus. Kohlberg's model focuses 
upon externally based rules (established by authorities to 
maximixe the gratification of all group members' needs) which 
are thoughtfully internalized and logically extrapolated to 
apply universally. The controlling force in his model is the 
rule or the principle, whether it exists externally or has 
been internalized. Gilligan's model emphasizes the internal 
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feeling of connectedness to others and the internal awareness 
of responsibility which grows out of relationships. The 
controlling force in her model is the feeling of care, even 
if it has been learned and internalized (according to the 
processes described by social learning theory). 
Similarities Between Moral Perspectives 
A major finding of this study was that persons at the 
two highest justice levels had Empathist, not Legalist, 
personalities. Levels two and three of the justice 
perspective may be viewed as an apparent hybrid of justice 
and care considerations. Kohlberg (1981) suggested that 
individuals at level three have an internalized set of 
ethical principles which preclude purposeful harm to self and 
others. These principles may at times supercede rules of 
civil authority which are inconsistent with the individual's 
ethical value system. They are thoughtfully deduced by the 
individual, reflect a concern for the welfare and dignity of 
all living beings and are capable of universal application. 
Individuals at the second level are aware of and appreciate 
the needs and desires of others as well as their ~ and 
interpret rules as having been established by authorities for 
the good of all society's members (Wise, 1986). 
Indeed, the care ethic and the justice ethic are not 
dissimilar. Findings from the current study allow 
comparisons between the two highest levels of each 
perspective. Individuals at the highest levels of both 
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approaches were quite similar. They were externally 
controlled Empathists. They differed in terms of sex role. 
Justice-based moral reasoners had masculine sex roles, while 
care-based moral reasoners had androgynous sex roles. 
Persons at the second levels of both approaches were also 
similar. They were internally controlling Empathists, also 
differing in terms of sex roles. Care-based moral reasoners 
had feminine sex roles, while justice-based moral reasoners 
had undifferentiated sex roles. 
Operationally Defining Moral Perspectives 
The difference between Gilligan's and Kohlberg's 
placement of emphasis is an outgrowth of the primary 
difference in their theoretical foundations. Kohlberg (1981, 
1963) adhered to the structuralist theoretical position which 
focuses upon cognitive structures that are proposed as 
underlying overt behavior. Structuralism tends to emphasize 
the potential influence of inherent factors (structures) in 
the explanation of behavior. It tends to minimize 
environmental effects, that is to say, the effects of 
socialization. While structuralists suggest that emerging 
structures are continually under construction owing to the 
individual's interaction with the environment, they stress 
the primary role of the extant structure in regulating 
environmental influence. 
By contrast, Gilligan adheres to a cognitive-behavioral-
social learning approach which stresses the role of the 
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environment in the influence and determination of behavior. 
It minimizes the potential influence of inherent factors in 
the explanation of behavior. The behavioral aspect of this 
theoretical body suggests that human behavior can be 
explained by a reciprocal determinism that involves 
behavioral and environmental factors (Skinner, 1953). The 
social learning aspect finds it desirable to introduce 
internal, cognitive variables. It holds that it is the 
subjective meaning and interpretation of the environment 
(behavior) in conjunction with environmental reinforcement 
that actually regulates behavior (Bandura, 1977; Rotter, 
1982, 1954). 
The social learning perspective is in keeping with that 
of the present study. "Inherent structures" are considered 
to be hypothetical constructs with limited heuristic value. 
It is logical and parsimonious for the behavioral sciences to 
focus upon behaving rather than upon abstract hypothetical 
constructs (such as rules, laws or principles) used to 
describe, prescribe, or predict behavior, even though such 
conceptualizations are productions of human behavior. 
Findings from this investigation support the social learning 
perspective. The internal awareness (behavior) involved in 
identifying with a particular personality type, locus of 
control orientation, and sex role orientation was associated 
with the internal awareness (behavior) involved in 
identifying with a particular moral perspective. 
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In addition, a paradox regarding locus of control 
orientation exists at the center of the propositions of each 
perspective. These paradoxes may be the genesis of much of 
the controversy regarding whether or not two separate and 
distinct moral perspectives exist, and if so, whether or not 
they are distinguishable by sex role orientation. Gilligan 
indicates Kohlberg's developmental model is a legalistic one 
resting primarily upon externally based rules and 
conventions. However, Kohlberg suggests his model defines 
moral reasoning as an inherent, internal cognitive ability 
(structure) modifiable by experience. It indicates that the 
structure is initially under genetic control and not under 
the control of one's own conscious volition. This structure 
is modified by social rules at which time it is under the 
control of external factors. The modification of the 
structure is the internalization of the external, social 
rules. However, when the external rules are internalized, 
they are then exercised volitionally, i.e., they are under 
the conscious control of one's own will. Thus, the major 
controlling forces throughout this developmental process can 
be seen to be internally located (first genetically, then 
volitionally) which is contrary to Gilligan's suggestion. 
Gilligan's model rests upon a social learning 
perspective. However, it presents moral reasoning as 
initially an innate, conscious, volitional, internal 
behavioral awareness of a need for self-care. This 
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behavioral awareness is modified by external socialization 
regarding connectedness-to-others and responsibility in 
relationships during which time it is under the control of 
external factors. However, once the behavioral awareness is 
modified to include awareness of responsibility in 
relationships, it is once again under conscious, volitional, 
internal control. Thus, the major controlling force can be 
seen as internal, contrary to Gilligan's social learning 
perspective. 
Findings in the current study suggest that, at least 
among young adults, control begins internally, stays internal 
through the second levels, and ends with external control at 
the highest levels. These results fail to support either 
Gilligan's or Kohlberg's theoretical conceptualizations. In 
both of their perspectives, control is initially internal, 
then becomes external during socialization or "structure" 
modification, and finally comes to be internal at the highest 
levels of moral reasoning. Thus, once again, the locus of 
control factor may have been an extraneous variable in prior 
studies giving rise to the many inconsistent findings. 
In addition to problems associated with operationally 
defining the different levels of moral reasoning, moral 
perspective research suffers the problem of not possessing a 
sufficient variety of well-tested instruments to measure the 
care perspective. The scale reliabilities for the three 
Relationship Self Inventories used in the current study are 
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.65 (care level three), .64 (care level two), and .74 (care 
level one). These reliabilities are near the low range of 
acceptability in social science research. Further refinement 
and utilization of the RSI will better determine its validity 
and reliability. 
Recommendations 
The findings of the present investigation offer 
direction for future research and theory building on moral 
perspective-taking. Research should address and elaborate a 
better understanding of all the psycho-social attributes 
involved in moral perspectives, especially locus of control 
orientation. Such research should address the relationship 
between sex role orientation and locus of control orientation 
in their association with moral perspective-taking. 
Future studies need to clarify the relative importance 
of psycho-social variables to moral perspective with other 
multivariate models. The heuristic value of the current 
study's results are limited by the nature of the 
correlational statistics (multiple discriminant analysis) 
used in the analyses. Subsequent research should investigate 
whether a path model can be identified which will indicate 
any moderating effects that locus of control orientation may 
have on moral perspective outcomes. 
Finally, there is a need to determine whether or not a 
conceptual framework can be devised which will synthesize 
b~ h the similarities and the distinctions between the two 
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moral ethics. Such a comprehensive framework would include, 
as suggested by Gilligan ( 1988) ·, a synthesis of the 
conceptions pertaining to moral reasoning based upon human 
behavioral awareness of responsibility in relationships and 
those based upon the influence of abstract laws and 
principles. 
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GENERAL INFORMATION 
Subject * -1- -2- -3-
Card # 1 
-4-
CIRCLE ONLY ONE RESPONSE UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED 
1. What is your sex/gender? 
1 Male -5-
2 Female 
2. What is your race? 
-r 
1 White (Caucasian) 
2 Black (Negro) 
3 Other (Specify) 
3. How old are you? 
7 -8-
4. Are you currently single, married, 
widowed, divorced, or separated? 
1 Single How long (years) 
-9- 10 li 
2 Married How long (years) 
3 Widowed How long (years) 
4 Divorced How long (years) 
5 Separated How long (years) 
5. What is your curriculum? 
1 College Transfer 
Specify Eventual Major If Known 12 
2 Technical (Specify) 
6. How many hours per week do you work 
at a job? 
1 None 
2 0 - 10 
3 10 - 20 
4 20 - 30 
5 30 - 40 
6 More than 40 
7. What kind of work do you do at your job? 
8. How much money do you earn in an average week? 
9. Which of these best describes your 
living arrangements? 
1 Live alone; completely self-supporting 
2 Live alone; rely upon parents/family for 
than one-half my financial support 
3 Live alone; rely upon parents/family for 
than one-half my financial support 
less 
more 
4 Live with roomate(s); rely upon parents/family 
for less than one-half my financial support 
5 Live with roomate(s); rely upon parents/family 
for more than one-half my financial support 
6 Live with parents/family; rely upon them for 
less than one-half my financial support 
7 Live with parents/family; rely upon them for 
more than one-half my financial support 
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10. Which of these best describes how far your 
money goes? 15 
3 You have enough money for everything you need 
2 You have enough money if you're careful 
1 You do not have enough money for things that you need 
11. Which of these best describes your MOTHER's 
level of formal education? 16 u 
1 Below 8th grade 
2 Completed 8th grade 
3 Completed 9th grade 
4 Completed lOth grade 
5 Completed 11th grade 
6 Completed 12th grade 
7 Completed 1 year college 
8 Completed 2 years college 
9 Completed 3 years college 
10 Completed 4 years college 
11 Completed 1 year graduate school 
12 Completed 2 years graduate school 
13 Completed 3 years graduate school 
14 Completed 4 years graduate school 
15 Beyond 4 years graduate school 
12. Which of these best describes your FATHER'S 
level of formal education? 
1 Below 8th grade 
2 Completed 8th grade 
3 Completed 9th grade 
4 Completed lOth grade 
5 Completed 11th grade 
6 Completed 12th grade 
7 Completed 1 year college 
8 Completed 2 years college 
9 Completed 3 years college 
10 Completed 4 years college 
11 Completed 1 year graduate school 
12 Completed 2 years graduate school 
13 Completed 3 years graduate school 
14 Completed 4 years graduate school 
15 Beyond 4 years graduate school 
13. What is your MOTHER'S occupation? Be specific 
as to the type of work she does. 
14. What is your FATHER'S occupation? Be specific 
as to the type of work he does. 
15. If you are married, what is your SPOUSE'S 
occupation? Be specific as to the type of work 
he/she does. 
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16. If you are single, living alone or with roomates, 
which of the following best describes your annual 20 
income? Exclude financial help from parents/family. 
1 Below $5000.00 
2 $5000 - $10,999 
3 $11,000 - $15,999 
4 $16,000 - $20,999 
5 $21,000 - $25,999 
6 $26,000 - $31,000 
7 More than $31,000 
17. If you are single and live with parents/family, 
or if you are married, which of the following 
best describes your household income? 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
1~ 
Below $10,000 
$10,000 - $15,999 
$16,000 - $20,999 
$21,000 - $25,999 
$26,000 - $30,999 
$31,000 - $35,999 
$36,000 - $40,999 
$41,000 - $45,999 
$46,000 - $50,999 
$51,000 - $55,999 
$56,000 - $60,999 
$61,000 - $65,999 
$66,000 - $70,999 
$71,000 - $75,999 
$76,000 - $80,999 
16 $81,000 - $85,999 
17 $86,000 - $90,999 
18 $91,000 - $95,999 
19 $96,000 - $100,000 
20 More than $100,000 
